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REVISIONS OF THE THOMPSON MEMORANDUM AND AVOIDING THE 
STEIN PROBLEMS: A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL POLICY ON THE 
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
BRENDAN J. KEEFE 
 
Since 1999, the Department of Justice has periodically issued 
memoranda instructing United States Attorneys on how to indict business 
organizations.  These memoranda became constitutionally questionable 
after the Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia scandals.  Finally, a federal 
district court declared part of one memorandum—known as the Thompson 
Memorandum—in conjunction with the way the assistant U.S. attorney 
presented the case against certain high-ranking employees of a business 
organization, KPMG, LLP, to be in violation of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.  This case is United States v. Stein. 
This Note examines the district court case, the Second Circuit case that 
affirmed the district court’s decision, and the subsequent memoranda 
produced by the Department of Justice.  This Note examines the 
subsequent memoranda to determine whether the constitutional 
deficiencies were remedied.  This Note concludes that although the Stein 
problems were resolved in the later memoranda, other potentially 
constitutional problems exist.  These problems are identified and 
discussed. 
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REVISIONS OF THE THOMPSON MEMORANDUM AND AVOIDING THE 
STEIN PROBLEMS: A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL POLICY ON THE 
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS  
BRENDAN J. KEEFE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has attempted to finalize its policy 
on charging corporations criminally since 1999.  In that year, then-Deputy 
Attorney General Eric Holder1 released the first policy in a memorandum 
entitled “Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations” (“Holder 
Memorandum”).2  Over the years there have been many catalysts forcing 
change to the policy.  After the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the DOJ 
made the policy more stern.  This new policy was formulated by then-
Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson in 2003.  It was entitled 
“Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations” 
(“Thompson Memorandum”).3  For various reasons discussed in detail 
below, the district court held in United States v. Stein that some aspects of 
this new policy were unconstitutional.4  While appealing this decision, the 
Government changed the policy to make it conform better to the court’s 
holding.5  The third attempt is known as the “McNulty Memorandum.”6  
                                                                                                                          
* Trinity College, B.A. 2007; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2010.  I 
would like to thank Professor Leonard Orland for his invaluable comments and guidance, without 
which this Note would not have been possible.  I would also like to thank the tireless staff of the 
Connecticut Law Review for their hard work.  This Note is dedicated to my parents, Hugh and Dorothy 
Keefe, for their constant love and support.  Any errors contained herein are mine and mine alone. 
1 Eric Holder is now serving as President Obama’s Attorney General.  See Neil A. Lewis, Holder 
Is Confirmed as Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/us/ 
politics/03holder.html?hp (“The Senate voted overwhelmingly Monday evening to confirm Eric H. 
Holder, Jr. to be the new attorney general of the United States.”). 
2 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and United 
States Attorneys, on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html [hereinafter Holder 
Memorandum]. 
3 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Department 
Components, United States Attorneys, on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm [hereinafter 
Thompson Memorandum]. 
4 United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
5 See James M. Keneally & Conor S. Harris, Revisions to the DOJ’s Guidelines on Corporate 
Prosecutions, 23 ANDREWS LITIG. REP. 3, 4 (2008) (“Soon after Stein I was issued, the Thompson 
Memorandum was replaced by the McNulty Memorandum, which was issued by then-Deputy Attorney 
General Paul McNulty Dec. 12, 2006.”). 
6 Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Department Components, 
United States Attorneys, on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 
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On the same day that the Stein decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, the DOJ announced the latest revisions to its policy on 
prosecuting business organizations.7  On August 28, 2008, then-Deputy 
Attorney General Mark R. Filip announced these revisions which were not 
in the form of a memorandum, but rather were made directly to the United 
States Attorney’s Manual.8  This Note examines whether the DOJ has 
cured the “Stein problems” with the Filip revisions. 
In Stein, the Government attempted to prosecute sixteen employees9 of 
the accounting firm KPMG, LLP (“KPMG”) for allegedly creating and 
marketing fraudulent tax shelters.10  This has been called the “largest tax 
fraud case in United States history.”11  Time Magazine summarized the 
case in the following way:  “[T]he accountants have taken a prosecutorial 
beating.  A Senate subcommittee publicly grilled them.  The Justice 
Department suggested they blab without their lawyers present.  KPMG, 
bending to government pressure, stopped covering its employees’ crushing 
legal bills.  And all this happened before any court ruled the tax shelters 
improper.”12  In preparing for the trial of these defendants, the district court 
held that the prosecution violated the defendants’ Fifth and Sixth 
                                                                                                                          
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty 
Memorandum]. 
7 See United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Keneally & Harris, 
supra note 5, at 4–5; Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Deputy 
Att’y Gen. Mark R. Filip at Press Conference Announcing Revisions to Corporate Changing 
Guidelines (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip’s August 28 Press Conference]. 
8 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, ch. 9-28.00 (2008) [hereinafter U.S. Attorneys’ 
Manual], available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm; 
Filip’s August 28 Press Conference, supra note 7; see also Keneally & Harris, supra note 5, at 3. 
9 I will do as the court did and include KPMG partners in the term “employees” for ease of 
expression.  Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341 n.36. 
10 Id. at 330. 
11 See id. at 362 (“This is by no means a garden-variety criminal case. It has been described as the 
largest tax fraud case in United States history.”); see also Reuters, Defendants in KPMG Fraud Case 
Get a Break, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008, at C9. 
12 Reynolds Holding, Accounting for Crime, TIME, Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://www.time. 
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1597468,00.html.  With respect to the Senate subcommittee, the 
Stein I court described a particularly heated moment at the hearing: 
A few months later, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs “began an investigation into the development, 
marketing and implementation of abusive tax shelters by accountants, lawyers, 
financial advisors, and bankers.”  This led to public hearings in November 2003 at 
which several senior KPMG partners or former partners-three of them now 
defendants here-testified. 
The firm’s reception at the hearing was not favorable. Senator Coleman, the 
subcommittee chair, for example, opened the hearing by saying that “the ethical 
standards of the legal and accounting profession have been pushed, prodded, bent 
and, in some cases, broken, for enormous monetary gain.”  At another point, Senator 
Levin, the ranking minority member, in obvious exasperation at a KPMG witness, 
suggested that the witness “try an honest answer.” 
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338–39. 
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Amendment rights.13  This eventually led U.S. District Judge Lewis A. 
Kaplan of the Southern District of New York to dismiss thirteen of the 
indictments.14  This decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, but only on the Sixth Amendment grounds.15 
The Government made two decisions with respect to whom to hold 
accountable for the alleged fraud in this case.  First, the Government 
decided to enter into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“DPA”) with the 
corporation, KPMG.16  Second, the Government decided to indict and 
prosecute the individual employees it suspected of the criminal 
wrongdoing.17  As mentioned above, the prosecutors depended on the 
Thompson Memorandum in deciding whether to indict corporations when 
making these decisions.18  The Thompson Memorandum lists factors that 
must be considered by the United States Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) in 
determining whether to indict the corporation.19  Unlike the Holder 
Memorandum, the Thompson Memorandum’s factors are mandatory.20  At 
least one critic has said that the Thompson Memorandum has become 
“shorthand for prosecutorial abuse.”21 
The way a corporation can stave off indictment is by fully cooperating 
with the Government.22  Indeed, the Thompson Memorandum states that 
                                                                                                                          
13 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 330. 
14 See United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The 
indictment therefore will be dismissed as to thirteen of the sixteen KPMG Defendants.”). 
15 United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In light of this disposition, 
we do not reach the district court’s Fifth Amendment ruling.”). 
16 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 349 (“On August 29, 2005, KPMG and the government entered 
into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“DPA”).  KPMG agreed, among other things, to waive 
indictment, to be charged in a one-count information, to admit extensive wrongdoing, to pay a $456 
million fine, and to accept restrictions on its practice.  The government agreed that it will seek 
dismissal of the information if KPMG complies with its obligations.  In a nutshell, KPMG stands to 
avoid a criminal conviction if it lives up to its part of the bargain.”). 
17 See id. at 350 (“At about the same time [as the DPA was made], the government filed the initial 
indictment in this case.”). 
18 The Thompson Memorandum—unlike the Holder Memorandum—is mandatory.  See, e.g., id. 
at 338 (“Unlike its predecessor, however, the Thompson Memorandum is binding on all federal 
prosecutors.”). 
19 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3 §§ II–VIII. 
20 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (“Unlike its predecessor, however, the Thompson 
Memorandum is binding on all federal prosecutors.”); see also id. at n.12 (“The Thompson 
Memorandum sets forth nine factors that federal prosecutors must consider in determining whether to 
charge a corporation or other business organization.” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Resource 
Manual § 163 (2005))). 
21 Peter Lattman, The Holder Memo and Its Progeny, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2006, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/13/the-holder-memo. 
22 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 364, (“As KPMG’s new chief legal officer, former U.S. District 
Judge Sven Erik Holmes, testified, he thought it indispensable (as would any defense lawyer) ‘to be 
able to say at the right time with the right audience, we’re in full compliance with the Thompson 
Memorandum.’”); see also Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3 (“The main focus of the revisions is 
increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's cooperation.”). 
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the main reason for revising the Holder Memorandum was to put an 
“increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's 
cooperation.”23  The reason that the Thompson Memorandum is 
controversial is because it forces prosecutors to look negatively on a 
corporation if it pays for its employees’ legal fees, unless the corporation is 
legally bound to pay them—either by state statute or contractual 
agreement.24  In other words, if a corporation pays the legal fees of their 
employees, the corporation is less likely to be deemed to have cooperated 
with the Government.  This means that a corporation that pays for their 
employees’ legal fees is more likely to be indicted.  This policy, the district 
court noted, seems to be at odds with the constitutional rights of the 
defendants—specifically, the Fifth Amendment right to Due Process and 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.25 
Since the well-publicized indictment and subsequent collapse of 
Arthur Andersen, the attorney for KPMG, Robert S. Bennett, of Skadden 
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (“Skadden”) knew that an indictment 
could effectively kill KPMG.  After Arthur Andersen, it became clear that 
a corporation could collapse from an indictment alone, without a 
conviction or even a trial.26  Skadden was hired to “save” the corporation, 
not to “protect the individuals.”27  Mr. Bennett made this explicitly clear at 
the first meeting between Skadden and the USAO.28  Mr. Bennett also 
                                                                                                                          
23 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3.  
24 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (“Unlike its predecessor, however, the Thompson 
Memorandum is binding on all federal prosecutors.”); see also id. at 344 (“[It] was understood by both 
KPMG and government representatives as a reminder that payment of legal fees by KPMG, beyond 
any that it might legally be obligated to pay, could well count against KPMG in the government’s 
decision whether to indict the firm.”); Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, at § VI. 
25 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 356 (“The Government Violated the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments by Causing KPMG to Cut Off Payment of Legal Fees and Other Defense Costs Upon 
Indictment.”). 
26 See id. at 382 n.243 (“The indictment of Arthur Andersen LLP resulted in the effective demise 
of that large accounting firm, and the loss of many thousands of jobs of innocent employees, long 
before the case ever went to trial.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 337 n.11 (“[N]o major financial 
services firm has ever survived a criminal indictment.”); United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 
2d 390, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (referring to prosecutors’ indictment power as their “life or death” 
power); Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 165–66 (2008) (“The company’s indictment 
‘effectively put the eighty-nine-year-old firm out of business and forced tens of thousands of people to 
find new jobs.  It also had a dramatic effect on the accounting industry, by turning the ‘big 5’ into the 
‘big 4.’”). 
27 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (“[In a meeting with prosecutors] Mr. Bennett explained that 
Skadden had been hired in view of Mr. O’Kelly’s concern about the controversy with the IRS and the 
Senate hearings and that KPMG had decided to clean house and change the atmosphere at the firm.  He 
reported that the firm had taken high-level personnel action already, that it would cooperate fully with 
the government’s investigation, and that the object was to save KPMG, not to protect any 
individuals.”). 
28 Id. at 340. 
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referenced Arthur Andersen at this first meeting; the court summarizes his 
remarks as follows:  “In an obvious reference to the fate of Arthur 
Andersen, he said that an indictment of KPMG would result in the firm 
going out of business.”29  With the demise of Arthur Andersen looming 
overhead, it was clear to Skadden that anything short of full cooperation 
with the Government would risk indictment.30 
Because a simple indictment could be fatal to a corporation, the 
Government has the upper hand from the very beginning of the criminal 
justice process.  This makes it very easy for the USAO to enforce the 
Thompson Memorandum and its cooperation policy.  It also puts the 
Government in a paternalistic position.  A corporation facing indictment 
will offer to do a lot of things it ordinarily would not do.31  The 
Government has the responsibility to control the zealousness of the all-too-
willing-to-please corporation to ensure that no one’s constitutional rights 
are being violated.32  The district court here held that instead of looking out 
for the defendants’ constitutional rights, the Government encouraged 
KPMG to limit their defense whenever possible, thus violating the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments.33 
The history of the KPMG case can be somewhat confusing.  Before the 
Government appealed the case to the Second Circuit, there were four 
separate rulings.  For the convenience of the reader, the succinct summary 
of those rulings which was laid out by the Second Circuit is reproduced 
here: 
The United States appeals from an order of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
(Kaplan, J.), dismissing an indictment against thirteen former 
partners and employees of the accounting firm KPMG, LLP 
. . . (“Stein I”). . . . 
In later decisions, Judge Kaplan ruled that defendants 
Richard Smith and Mark Watson’s proffer session statements 
                                                                                                                          
29 Id. at 341. 
30 See id. (“He reported that the firm had taken high-level personnel action already, that it would 
cooperate fully with the government’s investigation, and that the object was to save KPMG.” (emphasis 
added)). 
31 Id. at 352. 
32 See, e.g., id. at 353 (“KPMG was extremely anxious to curry favor with the USAO by 
demonstrating how cooperative it could be, and . . . KPMG had an obvious conflict of interest with its 
present and former personnel on the question whether it had a legal obligation to pay fees.  Had the 
government been less concerned with punishing those it deemed culpable right from the outset, it 
would not have accepted KPMG’s word on this point.”); see also id. at 381 (“As a unanimous Supreme 
Court wrote long ago, the interest of the government ‘in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done.’” (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))). 
33 See id. at 353 (“[T]he government conducted itself in a manner that evidenced a desire to 
minimize the involvement of defense attorneys.”). 
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were obtained in violation of their Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, and that their statements 
would be suppressed . . . (“Stein II”); that the court had 
ancillary jurisdiction over Defendants-Appellees’ civil suit 
against KPMG for advancement of fees[] . . . (“Stein III”), 
vacated, Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir. 2007); 
and that dismissal of the indictment is the appropriate remedy 
for those constitutional violations . . . (“Stein IV”).34 
In examining the courts’ opinions and the various policies of the DOJ 
on prosecuting corporations, it is important to keep in mind two, 
sometimes conflicting, principles of American jurisprudence.  The first 
principle is that the United States distinguishes itself from other countries 
by not allowing corporations to get away with criminal wrongdoing.  This 
principle is better stated by the journalist Thomas Friedman: 
What makes capital provision work so well in America is the 
security and regulation of our capital markets, where 
minority shareholders are protected.  Lord knows, there are 
scams, excesses, and corruption in our capital markets.  That 
always happens when a lot of money is at stake.  What 
distinguishes our capital markets is not that Enrons don’t 
happen in America—they sure do.  It is that when they 
happen, they usually get exposed, either by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission or by the business press, and get 
corrected.  What makes America unique is not Enron but 
Eliot Spitzer, the attorney general of New York State, who 
has doggedly sought to clean up the securities industry and 
corporate boardrooms.35 
The second principle is that a criminal prosecutor’s interest is not in a 
conviction, but rather in the administration of justice.  As Justice 
Sutherland wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court in Berger v. United 
States: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done.  As such, he is in a peculiar and very 
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of 
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.  He 
                                                                                                                          
34 United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130, 135 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2008). 
35 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT 332 (2007). 
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may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should 
do so.  But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at 
liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as much his duty to refrain 
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one.36 
Judge Kaplan concluded his opinion by saying that justice was not done in 
Stein: 
Justice is not done when the government uses the threat of 
indictment—a matter of life and death to many companies 
and therefore a matter that threatens the jobs and security of 
blameless employees—to coerce companies into depriving 
their present and even former employees of the means of 
defending themselves against criminal charges in a court of 
law.  If those whom the government suspects are culpable in 
fact are guilty, they should pay the price.  But the 
determination of guilt or innocence must be made fairly—not 
in a proceeding in which the government has obtained an 
unfair advantage long before the trial even has begun.37 
Part II of this Note examines the pertinent facts of Stein I.  Part III 
discusses the district court’s reasoning behind ultimately finding that the 
KPMG defendants’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated.  
Part IV examines the reasoning behind the Second Circuit’s holding that 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the indictments, and identifies the 
relatively small piece of the district court’s ruling that was actually 
affirmed.  Part V examines the changes to the Thompson Memorandum 
and the DOJ policy on criminally charging corporations after the Stein I 
decision.  It also discusses the ways federal prosecutors can avoid a Stein 
decision in the future. 
                                                                                                                          
36 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  Judge Kaplan cited to Justice Sutherland’s 
description in Stein I.  Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 381.  See also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963) (“Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our 
system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.  An inscription on 
the walls of the Department of Justice states the proposition candidly under the federal domain: ‘The 
United States wins a point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.’”).  But see Kevin C. 
McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1453–55 
(2000) (“Berger neither defines nor applies an extraordinary prosecutorial duty.  Rather, it enforces an 
obligation that is quite ordinary in the sense that it applies equally to prosecutors, criminal defense 
lawyers, and civil advocates—the obligation of lawyers in a trial not to assert their personal knowledge 
of facts in issue.”). 
37 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 381–82. 
 282 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:273 
II.  FACTS OF STEIN I 
What follows is a brief overview of the facts.  Where there were any 
ambiguities or questions of fact, the court acted as the fact finder and made 
the ultimate conclusion.38 
A.  KPMG’s Policy on Paying Legal Fees 
The defendants in Stein I were partners or employees of the accounting 
firm KPMG, one of the largest accounting firms in the world.39  KPMG 
had a longstanding policy of paying for its employees’ attorneys’ fees, 
regardless of cost or whether the employees were charged with crimes.40  
The court noted that KPMG has gone to “remarkable” lengths in paying 
the legal fees of its employees.41  The court stated that KPMG paid over 
$20 million “to defend four partners in a criminal investigation and related 
civil litigation brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission.”42  
The parties stipulated that KPMG’s longstanding policy was to advance the 
legal fees without a preset cap or condition of cooperation with the 
Government.43  Furthermore, another stipulation stated: 
With the exception of the instant matter, KPMG is not aware 
of any current or former partner, principal or employee who 
has been indicted for conduct arising within the scope of the 
individual's duties and responsibilities as a KPMG partner, 
principal, or employee since [two partners] were indicted and 
convicted of violation of federal criminal law in 1974. 
Although KPMG has located no documents regarding 
payment of legal fees in that case, KPMG believes that it did 
pay pre- and post-indictment legal fees for the individuals in 
that case.44 
In other words, this was the first case in which KPMG did not pay its 
employees’ legal costs without regard to cost and without being 
conditioned on cooperation with the Government. 
                                                                                                                          
38 Id. at 352. 
39 Id. at 336. 
40 See id. (“KPMG long has paid for the legal defense of its personnel, regardless of the cost and 
regardless of whether its personnel were charged with crimes.”). 
41 See id. at 340 (“Moreover, the extent to which KPMG has gone is quite remarkable.”). 
42 Id. 
43 See id. (“[I]t had been the longstanding voluntary practice of KPMG to advance and pay legal 
fees, without a preset cap or condition of cooperation with the government, for counsel for partners, 
principals, and employees of the firm in those situations where separate counsel was appropriate to 
represent the individual in any civil, criminal or regulatory proceeding involving activities arising 
within the scope of the individual’s duties and responsibilities as a KPMG partner, principal, or 
employee.”). 
44 Id. 
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B.  DOJ Policy on Criminally Charging Corporations 
As mentioned above, the first DOJ policy on the subject of indicting 
corporations was the Holder Memorandum in 1999.45  This was written 
just before the corporate fraud scandals that occurred in the early 2000s.  
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act46 and 
President Bush established the Corporate Fraud Task Force in 2002.47  In 
the post-Enron, post-WorldCom era, and after the indictment and 
subsequent collapse of Arthur Andersen,48 the DOJ put forth new and 
tougher guidelines called “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations” (“Thompson Memorandum”) by then-Deputy Attorney 
General Larry D. Thompson in 2003.49  It is this edition of the DOJ’s 
policy on prosecuting corporations that has upset many legal groups50 and 
commentators51 and inspired subsequent legislation.52 
The Thompson Memorandum is similar to its predecessor the Holder 
Memorandum.  It is identical to it in the area concerning cooperation and 
advancing legal fees by business entities.53  Both the Holder and 
                                                                                                                          
45 Spivack & Raman, supra note 26, at 164.  Each revision to the memoranda takes the name of 
the Deputy Attorney General who authored it.  See Holder Memorandum, supra note 2. 
46 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
47 Spivack & Raman, supra note 26, at 164–65. 
48 See id. at 165–66 (“The company’s indictment ‘effectively put the eighty-nine-year-old firm 
out of business and forced tens of thousands of people to find new jobs.  It also had a dramatic effect on 
the accounting industry, by turning the ‘Big 5’ into the ‘Big 4.’”). 
49 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3. 
50 These groups include, among others, the Association of Corporate Counsels, the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the Business 
Roundtable, the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Civil Liberties Union and the 
American Bar Association.  See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, REPORT OF THE 
ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: EROSION AND YET, PROGRESS 
(2007), available at http://www.acc.com/public/reference/acpriv/adcom2006privilegeassessmt.pdf 
(summarizing the work that the ACC accomplished in confronting the federal policy from Oct. 2005 to 
Jan. 2007); see also Letter from Michael S. Greco, American Bar Association, to Alberto Gonzales, 
Attorney General, Department of Justice (May 2, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/ 
letters/attyclient/060502letter_acprivgonz.pdf (suggesting revisions to the DOJ policy on waiving the 
attorney-client privilege); Lynnley Browning, U.S. Tactic on KPMG Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 
2006, at C1; Corporate Lawyers Launch Attack on “Culture of Waiver,” CORP. CRIME REP., Mar. 6, 
2006, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/WCnews025. 
51 See, e.g., Lattman, supra note 21; Holding, supra note 12. 
52 See Keneally & Harris, supra note 5, at 5 (“Despite its attempt to alleviate some of the 
Thompson Memorandum’s perceived wrongs, the McNulty Memorandum failed to end criticism of the 
Department of Justice’s policy.  Congress is considering passage of legislation. . . . The House of 
Representatives already passed H.R. 3013, the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, and 
the Senate Judiciary Committee is currently considering its counterpart, S. 3217, the Attorney-Client 
Protection Act of 2008.”). 
53 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“On January 20, 2003, Mr. Thompson 
issued a document entitled Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (the 
‘Thompson Memorandum’) which, in many respects, was a modest revision of the Holder 
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Thompson Memoranda read, in pertinent part, as follows: 
VI.  Charging a Corporation: Cooperation and Voluntary 
Disclosure 
A.  General Principle: In determining whether to charge a 
corporation, that corporation’s timely and voluntary 
disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate 
with the government’s investigation may be relevant factors.  
In gauging the extent of the corporation’s cooperation, the 
prosecutor may consider the corporation’s willingness to 
identify the culprits within the corporation, including senior 
executives; to make witnesses available; to disclose the 
complete results of its internal investigation; and to waive 
attorney-client and work product protection. 
. . .  
Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is 
whether the corporation appears to be protecting its culpable 
employees and agents.  Thus, while cases will differ 
depending on the circumstances, a corporation’s promise of 
support to culpable employees and agents, either through the 
advancing of attorneys fees,54 through retaining the 
employees without sanction for their misconduct, or through 
providing information to the employees about the 
government’s investigation pursuant to a joint defense 
agreement, may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing 
the extent and value of a corporation’s cooperation.  By the 
same token, the prosecutor should be wary of attempts to 
shield corporate officers and employees from liability by a 
willingness of the corporation to plead guilty.55 
Clearly, both policies put a great emphasis on cooperation with the 
Government.  The Thompson Memorandum, however, went further in this 
respect than did the Holder Memorandum.  The Thompson Memorandum 
added the following paragraph, emphasizing what it would consider 
“impeding” behavior: 
                                                                                                                          
Memorandum.  Indeed, the language concerning cooperation and advancing of legal fees by business 
entities was carried forward without change.”). 
54 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, at n.4; see also Holder Memorandum, supra note 
2, at n.3 (“Some states require corporations to pay the legal fees of officers under investigation prior to 
a formal determination of their guilt.  Obviously, a corporation's compliance with governing law should 
not be considered a failure to cooperate.”). 
55 Holder Memorandum, supra note 2, § VI; Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, § VI 
(emphasis added). 
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Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is 
whether the corporation, while purporting to cooperate, has 
engaged in conduct that impedes the investigation (whether 
or not rising to the level of criminal obstruction).  Examples 
of such conduct include: overly broad assertions of corporate 
representation of employees or former employees; 
inappropriate directions to employees or their counsel, such 
as directions not to cooperate openly and fully with the 
investigation including, for example, the direction to decline 
to be interviewed; making presentations or submissions that 
contain misleading assertions or omissions; incomplete or 
delayed production of records; and failure to promptly 
disclose illegal conduct known to the corporation.56 
Still, the most important difference between the two memoranda is that the 
Thompson Memorandum is binding on all federal prosecutors.57  The 
Stein I court noted, “all United States Attorneys now are obliged to 
consider the advancing of legal fees by business entities, except such 
advances as are required by law, as at least possibly indicative of an 
attempt to protect culpable employees and as a factor weighing in favor of 
indictment of the entity.”58 
C.  Communication Between KPMG and USAO Determined to be Coercive 
Before examining these facts, it should be noted here that the actions 
of the federal prosecutors together with the underlying threat to 
uncooperative corporations inherent in the Thompson Memorandum were 
deemed to be “coercive” and thus violative of the defendants’ 
constitutional rights.59  After becoming aware that KPMG could possibly 
be indicted—and believing that indictment could very well mean the end 
of the firm—the chairman of KPMG hired Skadden attorney Robert S. 
Bennett to save the company.60  It was determined that the way to save 
KPMG was for the company to “cooperate” as best as it could with the 
                                                                                                                          
56 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, § VI; see also Keneally & Harris, supra note 5, at 4. 
57 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (“Unlike its predecessor, however, the Thompson 
Memorandum is binding on all federal prosecutors.”). 
58 Id. 
59 See id. at 352 (“As a direct result of the threat to the firm inherent in the Thompson 
Memorandum . . . .”); see also id. at 373 (“Hence, if the government’s pressure on KPMG ultimately 
resulted in improperly coerced statements, the matter may be fully redressed by suppression of the 
statements.”); id. at 360 (“The Right to Fairness in the Criminal Process Is a Fundamental Liberty 
Interest Entitled to Substantive Due Process Protection Where, As Here, the Government Coerces a 
Third Party to Withhold Funds Lawfully Available to a Criminal Defendant.”). 
60 Id. at 339. 
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Government.61  KPMG’s “cooperative approach” involved many aspects.  
The first aspect was to dissociate and sever ties with those who the 
Government may deem “culpable.”62  KPMG decided to “ask Jeffrey Stein, 
Richard Smith, and Jeffrey Eischeid, all senior KPMG partners who had 
testified before the Senate and all now defendants here—to leave their 
positions as deputy chair and chief operating officer of the firm, vice chair-
tax services, and a partner in personal financial planning, respectively.”63  
It seemed “cleaning house” was not enough, as the IRS made a criminal 
referral to the DOJ, which forwarded the referral to the USAO for the 
Southern District of New York.64  The USAO notified KPMG of the 
criminal referral, and they scheduled the first meeting.65 
At this first meeting, Skadden told the USAO that it planned to 
“cooperate fully” with the Government’s investigation.66  Skadden went 
even further, saying “the object was to save KPMG, not to protect any 
individuals.”67  Then the USAO turned to the subject of legal fees and 
inquired whether KPMG was obligated to “pay the fees and what their 
plans were.”68  Skadden asked for the Government’s view on the payment 
of legal fees.69  The USAO answered by pointing to the Thompson 
Memorandum.70  Skadden replied by saying that its common practice was 
to pay the legal fees, but the partnership agreements were vague and 
Delaware law gave the company the right to do whatever it wished.71  
                                                                                                                          
61 See id. (“[The chairman] retained . . . Robert S. Bennett[] ‘to come up with a new cooperative 
approach.’”). 
62 See id. (“One aspect of that new approach was a decision to ‘clean house’ . . . .”). 
63 See id. (“Given Mr. Stein’s senior position and his relationship with Mr. O’Kelly, his departure 
was cushioned substantially, although many of the facts have come to light only recently.  He ‘retired’ 
from the firm with a $100,000 per month, three-year consulting agreement.  He agreed to release the 
firm and all of its partners, principals, and employees from all claims.  He and KPMG agreed also that 
Mr. Stein would be represented, at KPMG’s expense, in any suits brought against KPMG or its 
personnel and himself, by counsel acceptable to both him and the firm or, if joint representation were 
inappropriate or if Mr. Stein were the only party to a proceeding, by counsel reasonably acceptable to 
Mr. Stein.”). 
64 See id. (“In the early part of 2004, the IRS made a criminal referral to the Department of Justice 
. . . which in turn passed it on to the United States Attorney’s Office for this district.”). 
65 See id. at 340–41 (“The USAO notified Skadden of the referral, and a meeting was scheduled 
for February 25, 2004.”). 
66 See id. at 341 (“He reported that the firm had taken high-level personnel action already, that it 
would cooperate fully with the government’s investigation . . . .”). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 See id. (“Ms. Neiman said that the government would take into account KPMG’s legal 
obligations, if any, to advance legal expenses, but referred specifically to the Thompson Memorandum 
as a point that had to be considered.”). 
71 See id. at 342 (“Messrs. Bennett and Bialkin told the USAO that KPMG’s ‘common practice’ 
had been to pay legal fees.  They added that the partnership agreement was vague and that Delaware 
law gave the company the right to do whatever it wished, but said that KPMG still was checking on its 
legal obligations.”). 
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Skadden then said that as long as it had the discretion to do so, it would not 
pay the legal fees for employees who declined to cooperate with the 
Government or who took the Fifth Amendment.72  On the subject of 
KPMG’s discretion to pay the legal fees, the USAO said that misconduct 
should not or could not be rewarded and referred to the federal 
guidelines.73  This comment was understood by both KPMG and the 
Government as a reminder of what is laid out in the Thompson 
Memorandum—if KPMG paid the legal fees, beyond what it was legally 
obligated to pay, it could be held against the accounting firm in the 
Government’s decision of whether to indict.74  The statement made 
immediately after, also by the USAO, supported this finding:  “[I]f u [sic] 
have discretion re fees—we’ll look at that under a microscope.”75  The 
Court concluded that, although “the USAO did not say in so many words 
that it did not want KPMG to pay legal fees, no one at the meeting could 
have failed to draw that conclusion.”76 
Mr. Bennett told the Government that it would present a “big problem” 
if KPMG did not advance any legal fees because the firm was a 
partnership.77  To solve this problem, Mr. Bennett said KPMG would put a 
limit on the fees ($400,000) and condition the payment of the fees on the 
individual employee “cooperating fully with the company and the 
Government.”78  KPMG would deem an employee “uncooperative” and 
thus stop payment on the legal fees if they invoked their Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.79  On a conference call between 
Skadden and the USAO, Skadden lawyers made it clear that they would be 
“as cooperative as possible” in order to keep the Government from 
                                                                                                                          
72 Id. 
73 Id.  There is some dispute over what the USAO meant by “federal guidelines”; however, the 
court found that the intent of the comment was immaterial because it was how the comment was 
understood that really mattered.  See id. at 342–43 (“But the Court finds it unnecessary to decide [an 
AUSA’s] subjective purpose in making the remark because what is more important is how her 
comment was understood.”). 
74 See id. at 344 (“In sum, [an AUSA’s] comment that ‘misconduct’ cannot or should not ‘be 
rewarded’ under ‘federal guidelines,’ whatever went through her mind when she said it, was 
understood by both KPMG and government representatives as a reminder that payment of legal fees by 
KPMG, beyond any that it might legally be obligated to pay, could well count against KPMG in the 
government's decision whether to indict the firm.”). 
75 Id. (citing the handwritten notes of Mr. Pilchen, an attorney for KPMG). 
76 Id. 
77 See id. at 344–45 (“[Mr. Bennett] reported that KPMG did not think it had any binding legal 
obligation to pay legal fees, but that ‘it would be a big problem’ not to do so because the firm was a 
partnership.”) 
78 Id. at 345. 
79 See id. (“KPMG would pay his fees so long as Ms. Warley [an employee] cooperated with the 
government.  For example, he said, no fees would be paid if Ms. Warley invoked her privilege against 
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.”). 
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indicting the firm.80  In response, the USAO urged KPMG to tell its 
employees to be “totally open” with the USAO, “even if that meant 
admitting criminal wrongdoing.”81  Skadden sent a form letter to all 
employees who “appeared to be under suspicion” by the Government.82  
This letter told them that their legal fees would be capped at $400,000; 
conditioned on their cooperation with the Government and being “prompt, 
complete, and truthful,” and that the payment of legal fees would cease 
immediately if the employee is charged by the Government with criminal 
wrongdoing.83  This was not enough for the USAO, however, and the 
Government demanded that KPMG send out a supplemental letter.84  The 
Government wanted KPMG to emphasize to their employees that they 
could meet with an investigator without the assistance of counsel.85  The 
court found that the purpose of demanding this supplement was to 
“increase the chances that KPMG employees would agree to interviews 
without consulting or being represented by counsel, whether provided by 
KPMG or otherwise.”86 
When the Government began investigating and interviewing individual 
employees, Skadden asked to be notified whenever an employee failed to 
cooperate.87  The Government notified Skadden many times about 
employees’ failure to cooperate.88  Skadden would remind the employee 
that their legal fees would be terminated if they refused to cooperate.89  In 
some cases, this would be enough for the employee to decide to cooperate.  
In others, they would continue to refuse whereupon they were fired and 
their legal fees were no longer paid.90 
                                                                                                                          
80 See id. (“Mr. Bennett assured the USAO that KPMG would be ‘as cooperative as possible’ so 
that the office would not exercise its discretion to indict the firm.”). 
81 See id. (“[The USAO] urged that KPMG tell its people that they should be ‘totally open’ with 
the USAO, ‘even if that [meant admitting] criminal wrongdoing.’”). 
82 See id. (“[A] form letter that Skadden was sending to counsel for the KPMG Defendants then 
employed by KPMG who had received subject letters from the government or otherwise appeared to be 
under suspicion.”). 
83 Id. at 345–46. 
84 Id. at 346. 
85 See id. at 347 (“No one suggests that either the original KPMG advice or the government’s 
subsequent proposal misstated the law.  The difference was one of emphasis.” (emphasis added)).  The 
USAO proposed the following language (Government’s proposed language is italicized): “Employees 
are not required to use this counsel, or any counsel at all.  Rather, employees are free to obtain their 
own counsel, or to meet with investigators without the assistance of counsel.  It is entirely your 
choice.” Id. at 346. 
86 Id. at 347. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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D.  The Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
Federal prosecutors—perhaps recognizing that indicting major 
corporations is not in the best interest of the public91—have increased the 
use of DPAs.92  DPAs are a form of pretrial diversion where the 
Government agrees to suspend charges against a corporation if the 
corporation agrees to cooperate by making certain changes.93  The 
corporation can avoid the severe collateral consequences of indictment by 
entering a probationary period during which it will agree to do two things: 
(1) the corporation will enact substantial internal reforms and (2) cooperate 
with the Government, effectively helping prosecutors build a case against 
individual employees.94  These obligations are generally set forth in a 
detailed “contract.”95  This contract usually states that the Government will 
agree not to pursue the criminal charges—that are typically filed 
simultaneously with the DPA96—and to dismiss them after a period of 
time—generally between one and two years—if the corporation agrees to 
honor all the terms of the agreement.97  These agreements are recognized 
as a compromise between the only two other options: a declination of 
prosecution and a guilty plea.98 
KPMG and the USAO entered into a DPA.99  KPMG agreed, among 
other things, to waive indictment, be charged in a one-count information, 
admit extensive wrongdoing, pay a $456 million fine, and accept 
                                                                                                                          
91 See Tom Bawden, KPMG Warned of ‘Death Spiral’ in Tax Shelter Fraud Case, TIMES, June 
20, 2007, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_ 
finance/article1957547.ece (“KPMG. . . told the US Justice Department that it would unleash a ‘nuclear 
bomb’ that would leave more than 1,000 companies without an auditor, if it indicted the firm. . . . 
KPMG employed 20,000 people ‘whose lives will be destroyed,’ he said. . . . ‘We’re asking you to use 
a smart bomb, not a nuclear bomb.’  [The USAO] referred to Mr. Bennett’s argument as ‘ridiculous,’ 
according to the documents, although it seemed to work.  Two senior US Justice Department officials 
intervened and KPMG avoided an indictment.”). 
92 See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 321 (2007) (“Their popularity with prosecutors has increased since the public 
opprobrium that followed the Arthur Andersen case . . . .”); see also Spivack & Raman, supra note 26, 
at 159 (“In the four years between 2002 and 2005, prosecutors and major corporations entered into 
twice as many of these agreements . . . as in the previous ten years combined.”).  But see Marcia Coyle, 
Deferred, Nonprosecution Deals Fall By 60%, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 9, 2009, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202428013402 (“The number of deferred and 
nonprosecution agreements between the U.S. Department of Justice and corporations declined by 60% 
in 2008—from a historic high of 40 in 2007 to 16 last year, according to a forthcoming study.”). 
93 Griffin, supra note 92, at 321. 
94 Spivack & Raman, supra note 26, at 160. 
95 Griffin, supra note 92, at 321. 
96 See id. at 322 (“Entry into a DPA ordinarily will coincide with the filing of formal criminal 
charges against a company, the suspension of Speedy Trial Act considerations, and the tolling of the 
statute of limitations.”). 
97 Id. at 322. 
98 Id. at 321.  
99 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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restrictions on its practice.100  The Government agreed that it would seek 
dismissal of the information if KPMG complies with its obligations.101  
KPMG could avoid a criminal conviction if it lived up to its part of the 
bargain.  The DPA also obliged KPMG to continue to cooperate 
extensively with the Government, both in general and in the Government's 
prosecution of this indictment.  It provides in pertinent part: 
7.  KPMG acknowledges and understands that its cooperation 
with the criminal investigation by the Office [USAO] is an 
important and material factor underlying the Office’s 
decision to enter into this Agreement, and, therefore, KPMG 
agrees to cooperate fully and actively with the [government]. 
8.  KPMG agrees that its continuing cooperation with the 
Office's investigation shall include, but not be limited to, the 
following: 
(a)  Completely and truthfully disclosing all information in its 
possession to the [government], including but not limited to 
all information about activities of KPMG, present and former 
partners, employees, and agents of KPMG; 
. . .  
(e)  Not asserting, in relation to the Office, any claim of 
privilege (including but not limited to the attorney-client 
privilege and the work product protection) as to any 
documents, records, information, or testimony requested by 
the Office related to its investigation . . . 
. . .  
9.  KPMG agrees that its obligations to cooperate will 
continue even after the dismissal of the Information, and 
KPMG will continue to fulfill the cooperation obligations set 
forth in this Agreement in connection with any investigation, 
criminal prosecution or civil proceeding brought by the 
Office or by or against the IRS or the United States relating 
to or arising out of the conduct set forth in the Information 
and the Statement of Facts and relating in any way to the 
Office’s investigation.102 
In short, anything the Government regards as a failure to cooperate could 
result in the prosecution of the information.103  If the Government decides 
                                                                                                                          
100 Id. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 349–50. 
103 Id. at 350. 
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to prosecute, they will almost certainly get a conviction because of the 
“extensive admissions of wrongdoing” KPMG made as part of the DPA. 
E.  The Court Makes Four Factual Conclusions 
The court held an evidentiary hearing to determine “whether the 
Government, through the Thompson Memorandum or otherwise, affected 
KPMG’s determination(s) with respect to the advancement of legal fees 
and other defense costs to present or former partners and employees with 
respect to the investigation and prosecution of this case and such 
subsidiary issues as relate thereto.”104  This hearing led the court to make 
four factual conclusions.  The first factual conclusion was that the 
Thompson Memorandum alone caused KPMG to decide not to pay the 
legal fees of its employees.105  Second, the actions of the USAO reinforced 
the threat inherent in the Thompson Memorandum, specifically that the 
paying of the legal fees could be held against the firm.106  Third, the 
Government acted in a manner that suggested that it wanted to minimize 
the involvement of defense attorneys and wherever possible, to interview 
KPMG employees without a lawyer present.107  Fourth, “KPMG’s decision 
to cut off all payments of legal fees and expenses to anyone who was 
indicted and to limit and to condition such payments prior to indictment 
upon cooperation with the Government was the direct consequence of the 
pressure applied by the Thompson Memorandum and the USAO.”108 
                                                                                                                          
104 Id. at 352. 
105 See id. (“First, the Thompson Memorandum caused KPMG to consider departing from its 
long-standing policy of paying legal fees and expenses of its personnel in all cases and investigations 
even before it first met with the USAO.  As a direct result of the threat to the firm inherent in the 
Thompson Memorandum, it sought an indication from the USAO that payment of fees in accordance 
with its settled practice would not be held against it.”). 
106 See id. at 352–53 (“Second, . . . [the USAO] deliberately, and consistent with DOJ policy, 
reinforced the threat inherent in the Thompson Memorandum.  It placed the issue of payment of legal 
fees high on its agenda for its first meeting with KPMG counsel, which emphasized the prosecutors' 
concern with the issue.  [The USAO] raised the issue and then repeatedly focused on KPMG’s 
‘obligations,’ thus clearly implying—consistent with the language of the Thompson Memorandum—
that compliance with legal obligations would be countenanced, but that anything more than compliance 
with demonstrable legal obligations could be held against the firm.”). 
107 See id. at 353 (“Third, the government conducted itself in a manner that evidenced a desire to 
minimize the involvement of defense attorneys.  This objective arguably is inherent, to some degree, in 
the Thompson Memorandum itself.  But there is considerably more proof, specific to this case, here. 
The contretemps with KPMG over its Advisory Memorandum demonstrated the government’s desire, 
wherever possible, to interview KPMG witnesses without their being represented by lawyers. . . . Had 
the government been less concerned with punishing those it deemed culpable right from the outset, it 
would not have accepted KPMG’s word on this point.”). 
108 See id. (“Absent the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the USAO, KPMG would 
have paid the legal fees and expenses of all of its partners and employees both prior to and after 
indictment, without regard to cost.”). 
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III.  DISTRICT COURT HELD THAT THE DEFENDANTS’                                
FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED 
A.  Summary of the District Court’s Due Process Analysis 
The district court’s ruling can be summarized by a syllogism.  First, a 
criminal defendant has a fundamental right to obtain and use resources 
lawfully available to him or her in order to prepare a defense, free of 
knowing or reckless government interference.109  This fundamental right is 
rooted in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.110  Second, the defendants in this case had such resources 
available to them.111  Third, but for the knowing or reckless government 
interference, the resources would not have been capped at $400,000 and 
conditioned upon full cooperation with the Government.112  Therefore, 
because the resources to prepare a defense were capped and conditioned, 
the defendants’ rights were violated.113  This section looks at each premise 
and the conclusion in turn. 
B.  First Premise: The Fundamental Right to Use Resources Without 
Government Infringement 
The Stein I court concluded that a criminal defendant has a 
fundamental right to obtain and use resources lawfully available to him or 
                                                                                                                          
109 See id. at 361–62 (“[T]his Court concludes that such a right is basic to our concepts of justice 
and fair play.  It is fundamental.”). 
110 See id. at 357, nn.121–22 and accompanying text (“The Supreme Court long has protected a 
defendant’s right to fairness in the criminal process.  It has grounded this protection primarily in the 
Due Process Clause as well as more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the 
Confrontation and Assistance of Counsel Clauses of the Sixth Amendment.  Whatever the textual 
source, however, the Court consistently has held that criminal defendants are entitled to be treated 
fairly throughout the process.  In everyday language, they are entitled to a fair shake.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
111 See id. at 336 (“KPMG long has paid for the legal defense of its personnel, regardless of the 
cost and regardless of whether its personnel were charged with crimes.”). 
112 See id. at 353 (“KPMG’s decision to cut off all payments of legal fees and expenses to anyone 
who was indicted and to limit and to condition such payments prior to indictment upon cooperation 
with the government was the direct consequence of the pressure applied by the Thompson 
Memorandum and the USAO.  Absent the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the USAO, 
KPMG would have paid the legal fees and expenses of all of its partners and employees both prior to 
and after indictment, without regard to cost.”); see also id. at 345–46 (“Skadden’s Mr. Rauh wrote to 
the USAO, enclosing among other things a form letter that Skadden was sending to counsel for the 
KPMG Defendants then employed by KPMG who had received subject letters from the government or 
otherwise appeared to be under suspicion.  The form letter stated that KPMG would pay an individual's 
legal fees and expenses, up to a maximum of $400,000, on the condition that the individual ‘cooperate 
with the government and . . . be prompt, complete, and truthful.’  Importantly, however, it went even 
further. It made clear that ‘payment of . . . legal fees and expenses will cease immediately if . . . [the 
recipient] is charged by the government with criminal wrongdoing.’”). 
113 See id. at 362 (“The Government’s Actions Violated the Substantive Due Process Right to 
Fairness in the Criminal Process.”). 
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her in order to prepare a defense, free of knowing or reckless government 
interference.114  This statement can be broken down into three separate 
elements.  First, the Government cannot knowingly or recklessly interfere 
with this right.  Second, a defendant has the right to obtain and use 
resources lawfully available to him or her to prepare a defense.  Third, that 
right is fundamental. 
The Government is prevented from interfering with the manner in 
which a defendant wishes to present a defense.115  The court noted that this 
“general rule” is “based on a presumption that the criminal defendant, 
‘after being fully informed, knows his own best interests and does not need 
them dictated by the State.’”116  The court then went further, stating that 
the “underlying theme” of all the case law it has reviewed on the subject is 
“that the government may not both prosecute a defendant and then seek to 
influence the manner in which he or she defends the case.”117  The court 
noted that there are several aspects to a defendant’s right to control the 
manner and substance of the defense.118  Two aspects of this right are 
particularly noteworthy.  
First, the court explained, “[a] defendant is guaranteed . . . ‘the right to 
be represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can 
afford to hire’—in other words, to use his or her own assets to defend the 
case, free of government regulation.”119  Second, the court said, “[n]or may 
the government interfere at will with a defendant's choice of counsel, as the 
Constitution ‘protect[s] . . . the defendant’s free choice independent of 
concern for the objective fairness of the proceedings.’”120  There is a subtle 
difference between these two separate aspects of the same right.  The first 
principle says simply that a criminal defendant is entitled to hire whomever 
he determines to be the best attorney he can afford.  The second principle 
says that the Government cannot interfere with a defendant’s choice of 
counsel. 
Finally, having concluded that there is a right, the court considered 
whether the right is fundamental.  The court began the analysis by noting 
that the “right to fairness in criminal proceedings has not been explicitly [] 
                                                                                                                          
114 Id. at 361–62. 
115 See id. at 357 (“So proper respect for the individual prevents the government from interfering 
with the manner in ‘which the individual wishes to present a defense.’”). 
116 Id. at 357 n.126 (citing Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)). 
117 Id. at 357. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989) 
(emphasis added)). 
120 Id. at 357 n.130 (quoting United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 818 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(internal citation and quotation omitted)); see also Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 279 (6th Cir. 
1985) (“[R]ecognition of the right [to counsel of choice] also reflects constitutional protection of the 
accused's free choice.”). 
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characterized [as fundamental] by the [United States Supreme] Court.”121  
This problem is overcome by the necessity of fairness in the criminal 
justice process.  The court held that this right was fundamental because 
“such a right is basic to our concepts of justice and fair play.”122  The court 
cited many cases to support this conclusion.  For example, the court quoted 
from Glucksberg:  “‘[N]either liberty nor justice would exist’ if fairness to 
criminal defendants were sacrificed.”123  The court also noted that: 
[T]he Supreme Court’s repeated recognition of the 
constitutional mandate of fairness in criminal proceedings 
strongly suggests that this right is “fundamental” for 
substantive due process purposes, at least in some 
circumstances.  Indeed, it would be difficult to conclude 
otherwise.  Our concern with protection of the individual 
against the unfair use of the great power of the government is 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”124 
C.  Second Premise: The Defendants in this Case Had Such Resources 
Available to Them, and They Were Entitled to Those Resources 
The district court found—as one of its four “Ultimate Factual 
Conclusions”—that KPMG had a long-standing policy of paying the legal 
fees and expenses of its personnel in all cases and investigations.125  This 
was only part of the matter.  It was more important that the defendants 
show that they were entitled to have their legal fees paid for them by their 
employer-company, KPMG.  The district court began this opinion by 
referencing “three principles of American Law,” the third of which is as 
follows:126 
The third principle is . . . simply this: an employer often 
                                                                                                                          
121 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 360. 
122 Id. at 362. 
123 Id. at 361. 
124 Id. 
125 See id. at 352 (“First, the Thompson Memorandum caused KPMG to consider departing from 
its long-standing policy of paying legal fees and expenses of its personnel in all cases and 
investigations even before it first met with the USAO.  As a direct result of the threat to the firm 
inherent in the Thompson Memorandum, it sought an indication from the USAO that payment of fees 
in accordance with its settled practice would not be held against it.”). 
126 Id. at 355.  The other two principles are as follows: 
The first principle is that everyone accused of a crime is entitled to a 
fundamentally fair trial.  This is a central meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution. . . .  The second principle, a corollary of the first, is that everyone 
charged with a crime is entitled to the assistance of a lawyer.  A defendant with the 
financial means has the right to hire the best lawyers money can buy.  A poor 
defendant is guaranteed competent counsel at government expense.  This is at the 
heart of the Sixth Amendment. 
Id. 
 2009] PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 295 
must reimburse an employee for legal expenses when the 
employee is sued, or even charged with a crime, as a result of 
doing his or her job.  Indeed, the employer often must 
advance legal expenses to an employee up front, although the 
employee sometimes must pay the employer back if the 
employee has been guilty of wrongdoing. 
This third principle is . . . very much a part of American 
life.  Persons in jobs big and small, private and public, rely 
on it every day.  Bus drivers sued for accidents, cops sued for 
allegedly wrongful arrests, nurses named in malpractice 
cases, news reporters sued in libel cases, and corporate 
chieftains embroiled in securities litigation generally have 
similar rights to have their employers pay their legal 
expenses if they are sued as a result of their doing their jobs.  
This right is as much a part of the bargain between employer 
and employee as salary or wages.127 
The defendants in this case claimed that KPMG was obligated to 
advance to them their legal fees since they were being charged with a 
crime that arose out of their duty to do their jobs.128  To paraphrase and 
combine the two aspects mentioned above,129 the court reasoned that a 
defendant has the right to use his or her own assets to defend the case, free 
of government regulation.  As mentioned above, the defendants in Stein I 
were not prevented from using their own money to defend their case; 
indeed, the crux of the case was that their employer, KPMG, would not pay 
for their legal fees, or at least not unconditionally.  This seeming 
disconnect is no small matter and the court did not overlook it.  The court 
considered this argument under its Sixth Amendment analysis, but it is 
equally applicable here.  The court wrote, “the government . . . argues that 
the KPMG Defendants have no right, under the Sixth Amendment or 
otherwise, to spend ‘other people’s money’ on expensive defense counsel.  
The rhetoric is appealing, but the characterization of the issue—and 
therefore the conclusion—are wrong.”130  The court then turned to tort laws 
to show that the defendants’ did indeed have a property interest in the legal 
fees:131 
                                                                                                                          
127 Id. 
128 See id. at 336 (“KPMG long has paid for the legal defense of its personnel, regardless of the 
cost and regardless of whether its personnel were charged with crimes.  The defendants who formerly 
worked for KPMG say that it is obligated to do so here.  KPMG, however, has refused.”). 
129 See supra text accompanying notes 119–24. 
130 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367. 
131 See id. at 367 n.180 (“The torts of interference with prospective economic advantage and 
inducement of breach of contract are well known.  Interference with prospective economic advantage 
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Here, the KPMG Defendants had at least an expectation that 
their expenses in defending any claims or charges brought 
against them by reason of their employment by KPMG would 
be paid by the firm.  The law protects such interests against 
unjustified and improper interference.  Thus, both the 
expectation and any benefits that would have flowed from 
that expectation—the legal fees at issue now—were, in every 
material sense, their property, not that of a third party.  The 
government’s contention that the defendants seek to spend 
“other people’s money” is thus incorrect.132 
D.  Third Premise: If the Government Did Not Interfere, Then KPMG 
Would Have Paid for the Defendants’ Legal Fees Unconditionally and 
Without Regard to Cost 
1.  The District Court’s Findings 
The defendants went further than just claiming that they were entitled 
to have their legal fees paid for by KPMG.133  They claimed that the only 
reason that their fees were cut off was because of improper government 
pressure.134  In other words, if the Government had not improperly 
pressured KPMG then KPMG would not have, among other things, capped 
the fees at $400,000 and conditioned the payment of these fees on 
cooperation with the Government.135  Eventually, the court agreed with the 
defendants, holding as one of its four “Ultimate Factual Conclusions” that: 
KPMG’s decision to cut off all payments of legal fees and 
expenses to anyone who was indicted and to limit and to 
condition such payments prior to indictment upon 
cooperation with the government was the direct consequence 
of the pressure applied by the Thompson Memorandum and 
the USAO.  Absent the Thompson Memorandum and the 
                                                                                                                          
covers interference with the ability to pursue legal remedies against another party.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
132 Id. 
133 Indeed the Stein I court recognized this, “If that were all there were to the dispute, it would be 
a private matter between KPMG and its former personnel.”  Id. at 336. 
134 See id. at 336 (“These defendants . . . claim that KPMG has refused to advance defense costs 
to which the defendants are entitled because the government pressured KPMG to cut them off.”). 
135 See id. at 345–46 (“Skadden’s Mr. Rauh wrote to the USAO, enclosing among other things a 
form letter that Skadden was sending to counsel for the KPMG Defendants then employed by KPMG 
who had received subject letters from the government or otherwise appeared to be under suspicion.  
The form letter stated that KPMG would pay an individual’s legal fees and expenses, up to a maximum 
of $400,000, on the condition that the individual ‘cooperate with the government and . . . be prompt, 
complete, and truthful.’  Importantly, however, it went even further. It made clear that ‘payment of . . . 
legal fees and expenses will cease immediately if . . . [the recipient] is charged by the government with 
criminal wrongdoing.’”). 
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actions of the USAO, KPMG would have paid the legal fees 
and expenses of all of its partners and employees both prior 
to and after indictment, without regard to cost.136 
The court put it another way, earlier in the opinion, this time emphasizing 
that it really was not a choice made by KPMG, as in there was no other 
option available to KPMG: “KPMG refused to pay because the 
government held the proverbial gun to its head.”137 
The Government argued that—the Thompson Memorandum and the 
actions of the USAO notwithstanding—the decision to cap and condition 
the advancement of attorneys’ fees was made completely by KPMG.  The 
court noted that: 
[T]he government points to the Statement of Facts attached to 
the DPA as evidence that KPMG made the decision 
concerning legal fees ‘on its own initiative’ and argues that 
‘this decision [w]as one reached by the firm for its own 
reasons, not at the request or direction of the Government.’138 
In short, the Government argued that KPMG came up with the idea to cap 
and condition the fees.  The Government could have pointed to something 
KPMG attorney Robert S. Bennett, of Skadden, said about this:  “In 
addition, it [KPMG] had done something ‘never heard of before’—
conditioned the payment of attorney’s fees on full cooperation with the 
investigation. . . . He noted that what was really ‘precedent-setting’ about 
the case was the conditioning of payment of legal fees on cooperation.”139  
This strongly suggests that it was KPMG and not the Government that 
came up with the idea to condition the payment of the attorney’s fees on 
full cooperation with the Government.  Indeed, it seems like KPMG was 
taking credit for coming up with this strategy and looking to benefit from 
doing so. 
The court responded to this argument by saying that “the argument [is] 
without merit.  There is no inconsistency between KPMG making the 
decision ‘for its own reasons’ and the decision having been a product of 
government pressure.  The Government pressure in fact was the reason that 
KPMG made the decision.”140  In other words, the Government’s argument 
fails to take into consideration the Thompson Memorandum and the 
actions of the USAO.  It was the influence of the Thompson Memorandum 
and the actions of the USAO that pressured KPMG to decide to cap and 
condition the legal fees. 
                                                                                                                          
136 Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
137 Id. at 336. 
138 Id. at 353 n.97. 
139 Id. at 349. 
140 Id. at 353 n.97. 
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2.  Discussion on Causation 
It is an interesting conclusion the court reaches when it finds that there 
is no inconsistency between KPMG making the decision for its own 
reasons and the decision having been a product of Government pressure.  
The court says that it is perfectly consistent because the Government 
pressure was the reason that KPMG made the decision.  This is interesting 
because it means that at least for the duration of time it took to make this 
decision, the interests of KPMG and the Government were the same, and 
that the Government acted first.  In other words, the court says that the 
Government made KPMG’s interests match the Government’s interests.  In 
doing what was best for KPMG, Skadden was also doing what the 
Government wanted.  Indeed, this was the purpose of the Thompson 
Memorandum and the USAO’s actions—to get corporation like KPMG to 
cooperate.  The only problem with this, of course, is that it is violative of 
the defendants’ constitutional rights.141 
Another argument the Government made was that although the 
Thompson Memorandum is strong in its language, in practice the 
Government only considers the payment of legal fees as a negative factor 
when those fees are used to impede.142  This argument was ultimately 
unpersuasive.  The problem was that the Government coerced KPMG to 
cap and condition legal fees.  The only piece of information that a defense 
lawyer can act on to have an idea of how the Government is going to treat 
the corporation he or she represents is the Thompson Memorandum, which 
is binding on all prosecutors.  Hence, what prosecutors do in practice is not 
important because it cannot be easily known to the defense attorneys: 
But whatever the government may do in the privacy of U.S. 
Attorneys’ offices and in the DOJ’s Criminal Division is not 
what defense lawyers see.  They see the Thompson 
Memorandum.  Few if any competent defense lawyers would 
advise a corporate client at risk of indictment that it should 
feel free to advance legal fees to individuals in the face of the 
language of the Thompson Memorandum itself.  It would be 
irresponsible to take the chance that prosecutors might view 
                                                                                                                          
141 See id. at 356 (“The Government Violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by Causing KPMG 
to Cut Off Payment of Legal Fees and Other Defense Costs Upon Indictment.”); see also Stein V, 541 
F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We further hold that the government thus unjustifiably interfered with 
defendants’ relationship with counsel and their ability to mount a defense, in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment, and that the government did not cure the violation.  Because no other remedy will return 
defendants to the status quo ante, we affirm the dismissal of the indictment as to all thirteen 
defendants.”). 
142 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 364 (“The USAO, possibly concerned with the breadth of the 
Thompson Memorandum, seeks to deal with this by asserting that, in practice, it considers the payment 
of legal fees as a negative factor only when payments are used to impede.”). 
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it as “protecting . . . culpable employees and agents.”  As 
KPMG’s new chief legal officer, former U.S. District Judge 
Sven Erik Holmes, testified, he thought it indispensable (as 
would any defense lawyer) “to be able to say at the right time 
with the right audience, we’re in full compliance with the 
Thompson Memorandum.”143 
E.  Conclusion: Because the Resources to Prepare a Defense Were 
Capped and Conditioned, the Defendants’ Rights Were Violated144 
The conclusion that the defendants’ constitutional rights were violated 
must follow if we accept the first three premises.  The defendants were not 
permitted by the Government to present the defense they wished to present 
because the Government limited the funds that were lawfully available to 
the defendants.145  Therefore, the Thompson Memorandum and the actions 
of the USAO are subject to strict scrutiny review.  “The Fourteenth 
Amendment ‘forbids the government to infringe . . . ‘fundamental’ liberty 
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement 
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling [government] interest.”146  In 
other words, there were two different requirements to survive strict 
scrutiny—the action must be narrowly tailored and the action must serve a 
compelling government interest. 
The Stein I court listed three independent goals of the Thompson 
Memorandum.  First, it is intended to be used as a guide for prosecutors 
who must decide whether to charge business entities.147  Second, it 
encourages these business entities to pressure their employees to help and 
cooperate with the Government.148  Third, it seeks to punish those whom 
the USAO deem culpable; indeed it attempts to frame the paying of legal 
fees as “protecting . . . culpable employees.”149  The Stein I court held that 
the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the USAO failed the strict 
scrutiny test because of the second and third “goals” listed above. 
The court noticed that the Thompson Memorandum did not say “that 
payment of legal fees may cut in favor of indictment only if it is used as a 
means to obstruct an investigation,” and therefore was not narrowly 
tailored.150  The Thompson Memorandum simply stated that “while cases 
                                                                                                                          
143 Id. at 364. 
144 See id. at 362 (“The Government’s Actions Violated the Substantive Due Process Right to 
Fairness in the Criminal Process.”). 
145 Id. 
146 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (emphasis omitted). 
147 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 See id. (“Nor does anyone suggest that an entity’s obstruction of a government investigation—
what the government has called ‘circling the wagons’ should be ignored in a charging decision.”). 
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will differ depending on the circumstances, a corporation’s promise of 
support to culpable employees and agents, either through the advancing of 
attorneys fees . . . may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the 
extent and value of a corporation's cooperation.”151  The Stein I court took 
issue with the fact that the Thompson Memorandum could deem certain 
employees “culpable” long before there is any hearing on the matter.  The 
court wrote that “[t]he job of prosecutors is to make the Government’s best 
case to a jury and to let the jury decide guilt or innocence.”152  The Stein I 
court went further, saying that the Thompson Memorandum requires the 
prosecutors to “abuse [their] power.”153  It is because of this that the 
Thompson Memorandum was not narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling government objective.154 
The court took issue with the premise inherent in the Thompson 
Memorandum—that a company cannot at the same time cooperate fully 
with the Government and pay for the legal fees of its employees.155  It is 
clear that the court did not like the presumption made in the Thompson 
Memorandum that irrespective of guilt, the payment of legal fees for their 
employees automatically implies non-cooperation.  The court provided the 
following explanation: 
[A] company may pay at the same time that it does its best to 
bare its corporate soul, stands at the government’s beck and 
call to provide information and witnesses, and does a myriad 
of other things to aid the government and clean the corporate 
house.  So it simply cannot be said that payment of legal fees 
for the benefit of employees and former employees 
necessarily or even usually is indicative of an unwillingness 
to cooperate fully.156 
Although this did not come from the mind of Mr. Thompson—as this part 
was also in the Holder Memorandum—he did defend the policy.  He was 
quoted as saying “that if employees really don’t believe they acted with 
criminal intent, ‘they don’t need fancy legal representation’ to defend 
themselves. There are lots of reasonably priced lawyers, he says.”157  The 
                                                                                                                          
151 See supra text accompanying notes 56–57. 
152 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363. 
153 See id. (“Punishment is imposed by judges subject to statute.  The imposition of economic 
punishment by prosecutors, before anyone has been found guilty of anything, is not a legitimate 
governmental interest—it is an abuse of power.”). 
154 Id. at 364. 
155 See id. (“There is no necessary inconsistency between an entity cooperating with the 
government and, at the same time, paying defense costs of individual employees and former 
employees.”). 
156 Id. 
157 See Laurie P. Cohen, Prosecutors’ Tough New Tactics Turn Firms Against Employees—As 
Sentencing Rules Stiffen, KPMG Axes Tax Partners, Won’t Pay Their Legal Costs—What 
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court was aware of this quote,158 and refuted it.  The court wrote that: 
The innocent need able legal representation in criminal 
matters perhaps even more than the guilty.  In addition, 
defense costs in investigations and prosecutions arising out of 
complex business environments often are far greater than in 
less complex criminal matters.  Counsel with the skills, 
business sophistication, and resources that are important to 
able representation in such matters often are more expensive 
than those in less complex criminal matters.  Moreover, the 
need to review and analyze frequently voluminous 
documentary evidence increases the amount of attorney time 
required for, and thus the cost of, a competent defense.  Thus, 
even the innocent need substantial resources to minimize the 
chance of an unjust indictment and conviction.159 
For all the reasons mentioned here and above, the court held that the legal 
fee advancement provision violated the Due Process Clause because it was 
not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling objective.160 
F.  Remedy 
An indictment is only dismissed if there is no other remedy available.  
Indeed, it “should not even be considered unless it is otherwise ‘impossible 
to restore a criminal defendant to the position that he would have occupied’ 
but for the misconduct.”161  Remedies for constitutional violations are 
narrowly tailored to the injury suffered.162  The Stein I court reviewed 
many possible remedies; it dismissed some163 and left the possibility to 
finding a remedy open and to be considered in the future.  It left the 
possibility of finding a monetary remedy open, stating the following: 
Thus, there are at least two possibilities for resolving the 
issue of advancement of defense costs. . . . Should that come 
                                                                                                                          
‘Cooperation’ Entails, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2004, at A1 (“But given that legal costs can run hundreds 
of thousands of dollars, isn’t the government being unfair to company employees if it pressures their 
employers not to pick up the tab?  Mr. Thompson’s response is that if employees really don't believe 
they acted with criminal intent, ‘they don’t need fancy legal representation’ to defend themselves.  
There are lots of reasonably priced lawyers, he says.”). 
158 Although it did not take it into account in its decision because it was not entered into evidence.  
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338, n.13 (“Naturally, the Court does not consider it in deciding this 
matter, as it is not in evidence.”). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 364–65. 
161 Id. at 374 (quoting United States v. Artuso, 618 F.2d 192, 196–97 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
162 Id. 
163 See id. at 376 (“This Court agrees.  Accordingly, monetary sanctions do not overcome 
sovereign immunity.”). 
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to pass, the possibilities of dismissal of the indictment and 
other remedies likely would appear in a different light.  In 
consequence, the Court declines to consider additional relief 
at this time, although it may do so in the future if KPMG 
does not, for one reason or another, advance defense costs.164 
In Stein II, the court ruled it “had ancillary jurisdiction over 
Defendants[] civil suit against KPMG for advancement of fees.”165  In 
Stein III, the Second Circuit vacated the Stein II ruling, thus ridding the 
district court of a possible remedy.166  In Stein IV, the court held that there 
is no other remedy available and it dismissed the indictments.167  The Stein 
IV court noted its reluctance to dismiss the indictments: 
The Court has reached this conclusion only after pursuing 
every alternative short of dismissal and only with the greatest 
reluctance.  This indictment charges serious crimes.  They 
should have been decided on the merits as to every 
defendant.  The Court well understands, moreover, that 
prosecutors can and should be aggressive in the pursuit of the 
public interest.  It respects the distinguished record of the 
United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of 
New York, which long has been, and continues to be, a 
model for the nation.  But there are limits on the permissible 
actions of even the best prosecutors.168 
The Second Circuit’s review of this case is discussed in great detail below. 
IV.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND THE VIOLATION OF THE                           
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of thirteen 
defendants’ indictments on Sixth Amendment grounds.169  It should be 
noted that the circuit court reached this holding by affirming only a 
relatively small piece of the district court’s decision.  As mentioned above, 
the district court found numerous Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations by 
the Government.  The circuit court only found it necessary to affirm one, 
and it did not reach the district court’s other rulings.  The specific action 
that the circuit court affirms as violative of the defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is “KPMG’s termination of fees upon 
                                                                                                                          
164 Id. at 380. 
165 Stein V, 541 F.3d 130, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2008). 
166 Id. 
167 Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 423, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
168 Id. at 427. 
169 Stein V, 541 F.3d 130 at 136. 
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indictment.”170  This means that the circuit court did not reach a decision 
on whether the “pre-indictment conditioning and capping of fees—conduct 
. . . determined [to be] state action—establishes a Sixth Amendment 
violation by itself.”171  The circuit court did not consider the district court’s 
Fifth Amendment ruling either.172 
The Second Circuit reviewed each of Judge Kaplan’s four ultimate 
factual conclusions, and could not find clear error.173  Most importantly, 
the court determined that Judge Kaplan’s factual finding that absent the 
Thompson Memorandum and the prosecutors’ conduct, KPMG would 
have advanced fees without condition or cap survives scrutiny.174  Since 
the court could not find clear error, it adopted these factual findings.175  
The circuit court held to this finding even though it deemed the 
Government’s argument “plausible.”176  The Government argued that 
“even absent government pressure KPMG would not have advanced legal 
fees indefinitely and without condition.”177  This was supported by the 
“undisputed” fact that KPMG’s longstanding fees policy was voluntary 
and subject to revision—in other words, it was not mandated by Delaware 
statute or in the employees work contracts.178  The circuit court refused to 
accept this argument because it directly contradicts Judge Kaplan’s 
“central” finding that “absent the Thompson Memorandum and the actions 
of the USAO, KPMG would have paid the legal fees and expenses of all of 
its partners and employees both prior to and after indictment, without 
regard to cost.”179 
A.  Government Action 
The court found that the actions of KPMG were influenced by the 
Government in such a controlling manner as to constitute “state action”: 
                                                                                                                          
170 Id. at 153–54 n.13. 
171 Id. 
172 See id. at 136 (“In light of this disposition, we do not reach the district court’s Fifth 
Amendment ruling.”). 
173 Id. at 142–45. 
174 See id. at 143 (“Finally, we cannot say that the district court’s ultimate finding of fact—that 
absent the Thompson Memorandum and the prosecutors’ conduct KPMG would have advanced fees 
without condition or cap—was clearly erroneous.”). 
175 See id. at 144 (“For the foregoing reasons, we cannot disturb Judge Kaplan’s factual findings, 
including his finding that, but for the Thompson Memorandum and the prosecutors’ conduct, KPMG 
would have advanced legal fees without condition or cap.”). 
176 Id. at 146. 
177 Id.  
178 See id. (“True, even if KPMG had decided initially to advance legal fees, it might always have 
changed course later: it is undisputed that KPMG’s longstanding fees policy was voluntary and subject 
to revision.  (In fact, in the civil suit KPMG represented that it would not have obligated itself to pay 
millions of dollars in fees on behalf of an unknown number of employees without regard to the charges 
ultimately lodged against them.)”). 
179 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if 
there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the 
challenged action of the . . . entity so that the action of the 
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. . . . Such 
responsibility is normally found when the State has exercised 
coercive power or has provided such significant 
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in 
law be deemed to be that of the State.180 
The court took into account the delicate nature of large corporations.  It 
noted how lethal an indictment could be to a corporation—regardless of 
whether the corporation is ever convicted.181  This showed that KPMG had 
good reason to believe that if it were indicted, it would collapse.  In order 
to stave off indictment, KPMG would have to cooperate fully with the 
Government.  Indeed, the reason KPMG retained Skadden was to 
formulate a “cooperative approach” when dealing with the USAO.182 
Since the Government’s Thompson Memorandum deemed the paying 
of legal fees to count toward indictment, KPMG’s defense attorney had no 
choice but to give in to government pressure on the matter.  As the court 
wrote, “Since defense counsel’s objective in a criminal investigation will 
virtually always be to protect the client, KPMG’s risk was that fees for 
defense counsel would be advanced to someone the Government 
considered culpable.  So the only safe course was to allow the Government 
to become (in effect) paymaster.”183  But the Government did not just 
control KPMG’s policy on advancing legal fees.  The Government became 
“entwined in the control of [the company] KPMG.”184  This was evidenced 
by the supplemental letter they demanded be sent to the employees stating 
that they do not need an attorney when interviewed by prosecutors.185  
Also, prosecutors regularly reported to KPMG the names of employees 
who it deemed uncooperative because “the USAO knew full well that 
KPMG would pressure them to talk to prosecutors.”186  The court 
                                                                                                                          
180 Id. at 146–47 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Blum v. Yaretsky, 
457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
181 See Stein V, 541 F.3d 130 at 142 (noting that “KPMG was faced with the fatal prospect of 
indictment”); see also id. (“Moreover, KPMG’s management and counsel had reason to consider the 
impact of the firm’s indictment on the interests of the firm’s partners, employees, clients, creditors and 
retirees.”). 
182 Id. at 137. 
183 Id. at 148. 
184 Id. (quoting Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 187 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
185 See id. at 143 (“On March 12, the prosecutors prevailed upon KPMG to supplement its first 
advisory letter with another, which clarified that employees could meet with the government without 
counsel.”). 
186 See id. at 148 (“They did so by regularly ‘reporting to KPMG the identities of employees who 
refused to make statements in circumstances in which the USAO knew full well that KPMG would 
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determined that this “overt encouragement” demonstrated sufficient 
control over KPMG’s decisions to support the conclusion that KPMG’s 
actions are properly attributed to the state.187  The Government took 
advantage of its influence over the company and calibrated KPMG’s 
desires to match the Government’s desires; in other words the Government 
attempted to get KPMG to think like the Government.  This was 
demonstrated by the following facts, as explained by the circuit court: 
KPMG was never “free to define” cooperation 
independently: [the USAO] told Bennett that he had “had a 
bad experience in the past with a company conditioning 
payments on a person’s cooperation, where the company did 
not define cooperation as ‘tell the truth’ the[ ] way we [the 
prosecutors] define it.”  KPMG's fees advancement decisions 
in individual cases thus depended largely on state-influenced 
standards.188 
B.  The Sixth Amendment Attaches at the Initiation of Adversarial 
Proceedings 
What should happen when the Government action occurs before the 
initiation of adversarial proceedings—and thus before Sixth Amendment 
protection—but the effect continues throughout the whole process?  Is the 
Sixth Amendment not implicated or is the Government unfairly gaming the 
system?  The Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the USAO had 
the effect of limiting access to funds for the defense of the defendants long 
before the first indictment.189  Even if this was not the intentional motive of 
the Government it certainly knew it was an “exceptionally” likely result.190  
The court reasoned that because the result will be “unconstitutional,” the 
fact that the actions took place before any defendants were indicted does 
not “save the government.”191  As the court wrote:  “In other words, the 
government’s pre-indictment conduct was of a kind that would have post-
indictment effects of Sixth Amendment significance, and did.”192 
                                                                                                                          
pressure them to talk to prosecutors.’” (quoting United States v. Stein (Stein II), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 
337 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))). 
187 See id. (“The prosecutors thus steered KPMG toward their preferred fee advancement policy 
and then supervised its application in individual cases.  Such ‘overt’ and ‘significant encouragement’ 
supports the conclusion that KPMG's conduct is properly attributed to the State.”). 
188 Id. at 149. 
189 Id. at 153. 
190 See id. (“Even if this was not among the conscious motives, the Memorandum was adopted 
and the USAO acted in circumstances in which that result was known to be exceptionally likely.”). 
191 See id. (“The fact that events were set in motion prior to indictment with the object of having, 
or with knowledge that they were likely to have, an unconstitutional effect upon indictment cannot save 
the government.”). 
192 Id. 
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If the Government is “saved” and the Sixth Amendment protections do 
not attach, the result would give federal prosecutors almost complete 
control over the corporations.193  The Government would assume complete 
control over the corporations for the same reasons that KPMG’s actions 
were deemed to be state actions in this case: a corporate defense attorney 
will do all in his or her power to avoid indictment.194  If the Government 
knows that corporations will be willing to fully cooperate with them, the 
prosecutors in effect also assume the roles of jury and sentencing-judge.  
This gives the Government tremendous bargaining power when the two 
parties attempt to reach a deferred prosecution agreement.  It also would 
open the door for the Government to interfere with the employee-
defendants’ defense without recourse.  This would simply give the 
prosecution too much authority and too much power over the employees of 
corporations. 
The alternative is to allow Sixth Amendment rights to attach for state 
action that occurs before the initiation of the adversarial process—before 
indictment—when that state action effects defendants after the adversarial 
process has begun.195  The circuit court explained that “[w]hen the 
Government acts prior to indictment so as to impair the suspect’s 
relationship with counsel post-indictment, the pre-indictment actions ripen 
into cognizable Sixth Amendment deprivations upon indictment.”196  Thus, 
the court did not change the rule that the Sixth Amendment “attaches only 
upon indictment.”197  The court does, however, say that pre-indictment 
governmental interference with the accused’s relationship with counsel 
becomes “ripe” upon indictment.  In other words, potentially coercive state 
action cannot go unexamined simply because it occurred before an 
indictment and especially because it helped to lead to that indictment. 
For this case, the circuit court wrote the following: 
Since the Government forced KPMG to adopt the 
constricted Fees Policy—including the provision for 
terminating fee advancement upon indictment—and then 
compelled KPMG to enforce it, it was virtually certain that 
KPMG would terminate defendants’ fees upon indictment.  
We therefore reject the Government’s argument that its 
actions (virtually all pre-indictment) are immune from 
                                                                                                                          
193 Absent intervening congressional legislation or changing of the DOJ policy, of course. 
194 See supra Part III.D.2. 
195 See Stein V, 541 F.3d 130, 153 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Although defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights 
attached only upon indictment, the district court properly considered pre-indictment state action that 
affected defendants post-indictment.”). 
196 Id. at 153. 
197 Id. at 148 n.9. 
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scrutiny under the Sixth Amendment.198 
Thus, the court refused to let the Government control and manipulate 
KPMG’s decisions without examining these actions under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Again, as mentioned above, the court only reached a 
decision on KPMG’s decision to terminate fees upon indictment—that this 
action is violative of the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel.199 
The circuit court reviewed the protection that is afforded an accused by 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  The court determined that the 
Government cannot prevent an accused from obtaining counsel and it 
imposes on the state the affirmative obligation to respect the decision of 
the accused.200  The court also noted that “the right to counsel in an 
adversarial legal system would mean little if defense counsel could be 
controlled by the Government or vetoed without good reason.”201  This led 
the court to ultimately conclude that “[i]n a nutshell, the Sixth Amendment 
protects against unjustified governmental interference with the right to 
defend oneself using whatever assets one has or might reasonably and 
lawfully obtain.”202  In other words, it does not matter that the funds were 
“other people’s money” as the Government argued.203  Because the circuit 
court adopted the district court’s finding—that, absent the Thompson 
Memorandum and the actions of the USAO, KPMG would have paid the 
legal fees and expenses of all of its partners and employees both prior to 
and after indictment, without regard to cost—that simply interfering with 
the subject-to-change legal fees policy of the corporation was enough for a 
Sixth Amendment violation. 
In conclusion, the district court found that the defendants were forced 
to limit their defense—in the economic sense—and would not have had to 
do so had the Government not interfered in violation of their constitutional 
rights.204  The circuit court found the same.205  This interference “caused 
                                                                                                                          
198 Id. at 153. 
199 Id. at 153 n.13. 
200 Id. at 154 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170–71 (1985)). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 156. 
203 Id. at 141. 
204 Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
205 See Stein V, 541 F.3d at 151–52 n.10.  The court explained that, in Stein IV: 
All of the [present] KPMG Defendants . . . say that KPMG’s refusal to pay their 
post-indictment legal fees has caused them to restrict the activities of their counsel, 
limited or precluded their attorneys’ review of the documents produced by the 
government in discovery, prevented them from interviewing witnesses, caused them 
to refrain from retaining expert witnesses, and/or left them without information 
technology assistance necessary for dealing with the mountains of electronic 
discovery.  The government has not contested these assertions.  The Court therefore 
has no reason to doubt, and hence finds, that all of them have been forced to limit 
their defenses in the respects claimed for economic reasons and that they would not 
have been so constrained if KPMG paid their expenses subject only to the usual sort 
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them to restrict the activities of their counsel, and thus to limit the scope of 
their pre-trial investigation and preparation.”206  This is emphasized by the 
“extremely complex” nature of the case and the expectation that a trial was 
expected to last between six to eight months.207  Therefore, the court 
concluded that the defendants’ rights were violated under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Finding no other remedy available, the court affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal of the indictments.208 
Although the court specifically said it did not reach the issue of 
whether the capping and conditioning of fees violates the defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, there was no reason to believe that the Court 
would not find that it did violate the Sixth Amendment.209  First, the circuit 
court already deemed this action as “state action.”210  Second, the court 
held that KPMG’s termination of fees upon indictment deprived 
defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the 
defendants were forced to limit their defense—something they would not 
have had to do if the Government had not interfered.211  The decision to put 
a cap on the legal fees and to condition the payment of the fees on 
cooperation had the same effect on their defense as did terminating the fees 
upon indictment.  It was the same because they were deprived of funds that 
would have been advanced to them, had the Government not interfered.212 
There is no reason to believe that terminating the payment of fees upon 
indictment is any more violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
than terminating the payment of fees upon not cooperating with the 
Government.  Indeed, once the act of conditioning the payment of legal 
fees on cooperation with the state is deemed a state action—as it was 
                                                                                                                          
of administrative requirements typically imposed by corporate law departments on 
outside counsel fees. 
Id. 
206 Id. at 157. 
207 Id. 
208 See id. (“In the district court, the government conceded that these defendants are also entitled 
to dismissal of the indictment, assuming the correctness of Stein I.  We agree.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
209 Id. at 153 n.13. 
210 See id. at 136 (“We hold that KPMG’s adoption and enforcement of a policy under which it 
conditioned, capped and ultimately ceased advancing legal fees to defendants followed as a direct 
consequence of the government’s overwhelming influence, and that KPMG's conduct therefore 
amounted to state action.”). 
211 See id. at 157 (“In the district court, the government conceded that these defendants are also 
entitled to dismissal of the indictment, assuming the correctness of Stein I.  We agree.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
212 See id. at 146 (“[T]he district court’s central finding—which is not clearly erroneous—that 
‘[a]bsent the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the USAO, KPMG would have paid the legal 
fees and expenses of all of its partners and employees both prior to and after indictment, without regard 
to cost.’  Because we cannot disturb this finding, we cannot accept the government’s claim of cure on 
this score.” (internal references omitted)). 
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deemed so here by the circuit court213—it is difficult to see how it could be 
any more violative of the Sixth Amendment.  This would mean that the 
government is conditioning the payment of the defendants’ legal fees on 
the defendants’ cooperation with the government.  This is even more 
shocking since it is the Government that defines “cooperation” by the 
factors listed in the Thompson Memorandum.214 
V.  REVISIONS OF THE THOMPSON MEMORANDUM AND CURING THE STEIN 
PROBLEMS 
Because the Holder Memorandum and the Thompson Memorandum 
are examined in detail in Part II of this Note, this discussion will only 
consider the revisions since the Thompson Memorandum: the McNulty 
Memorandum and the Filip revisions. 
A.  The McNulty Memorandum 
There were two main problems with the Thompson Memorandum.  
First, it encouraged prosecutors to seek waivers of the attorney-client and 
work product privileges.215  Second, it held against the corporation the 
advancement of legal fees to its employees.216  The McNulty Memorandum 
sought to fix some of these problems.  The McNulty Memorandum is 
prefaced with a shorter memorandum explaining the revisions: 
I have decided to adjust certain aspects of our policy in 
ways that will further promote public confidence in the 
Department, encourage corporate fraud prevention efforts, 
and clarify our goals without sacrificing our ability to 
prosecute these important cases effectively.  The new 
language expands upon the Department's long-standing 
                                                                                                                          
213 See supra note 210. 
214 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, § VI.A (“In gauging the extent of the 
corporation’s cooperation, the prosecutor may consider the corporation’s willingness to identify the 
culprits within the corporation, including senior executives; to make witnesses available; to disclose the 
complete results of its internal investigation; and to waive attorney-client and work product 
protection.”). 
215 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, § II.A.4 (“[T]he corporation’s timely and 
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, 
including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product protection.”); see also 
id. § VI.A (“In determining whether to charge a corporation, that corporation’s timely and voluntary 
disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate with the government’s investigation may be 
relevant factors.  In gauging the extent of the corporation’s cooperation, the prosecutor may consider 
the corporation’s willingness . . . to waive attorney-client and work product protection.”). 
216 See id. § VI.B (“Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation 
appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agents.  Thus, while cases will differ depending on 
the circumstances, a corporation’s promise of support to culpable employees and agents, either through 
the advancing of attorneys fees . . . may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the extent and 
value of a corporation’s cooperation.”). 
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policies concerning how we evaluate the authenticity of a 
corporation’s cooperation with a government investigation.217 
Mr. McNulty also notes that he is aware of the criticisms of the Thompson 
Memorandum by groups within the corporate legal community.218 
For waivers of the attorney-client and work product privileges, the 
McNulty Memorandum instructs prosecutors to seek a waiver only if a 
legitimate need for it exists, and then in the least intrusive manner.219  The 
McNulty Memorandum distinguishes between “Category I” and “Category 
II” privileged information.  Prosecutors are instructed to try to obtain 
purely factual information relating to the underlying misconduct first; this 
is Category I information.  This information may or may not be privileged.  
“Only if the purely factual information provides an incomplete basis to 
conduct a thorough investigation should prosecutors then request that the 
corporation provide attorney-client communications or non-factual 
attorney work product.”220  This is Category II information.  “This 
information includes legal advice given to the corporation before, during, 
and after the underlying misconduct occurred.”221  Under the McNulty 
Memorandum, prosecutors must obtain written authorization from the 
United States Attorney when seeking Category I information and they must 
obtain written authorization from the Deputy Attorney General before 
seeking waiver for Category II information.222  If a corporation refuses to 
provide Category II information, prosecutors are not allowed to consider 
this as a negative factor; however, if they do provide the information, 
prosecutors are allowed to consider this as a positive factor.223 
The McNulty Memorandum made a few changes to the policy on 
advancing legal fees.  It states, “[p]rosecutors generally should not take 
into account whether a corporation is advancing attorneys’ fees to 
employees or agents under investigation and indictment.”224  In a footnote, 
the memorandum makes an exception of this general principle for 
“extremely rare cases” when “the totality of the circumstances show that it 
                                                                                                                          
217 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6. 
218 See id. (“Many of those associated with the corporate legal community have expressed concern 
that our practices may be discouraging full and candid communications between corporate employees 
and legal counsel.  To the extent this is happening, it was never the intention of the Department for our 
corporate charging principles to cause such a result.”). 
219 Id. § 7.B.2; see also Keneally & Harris, supra note 5, at 4. 
220 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, § 7.B.2. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 See id. (“If a corporation declines to provide a waiver for Category II information after a 
written request from the United States Attorney, prosecutors must not consider this declination against 
the corporation in making a charging decision.  Prosecutors may always favorably consider a 
corporation’s acquiescence to the government’s waiver request in determining whether a corporation 
has cooperated in the government’s investigation.”); see also Keneally & Harris, supra note 5, at 4. 
224 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, § 7.B.3. 
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was intended to impede a criminal investigation.”225  The memorandum 
goes on to define what it considers impeding conduct.  Such conduct 
includes the following: 
[O]verly broad assertions of corporate representation of 
employees or former employees; . . . inappropriate directions 
to employees or their counsel, such as directions not to 
cooperate openly and fully with the investigation including, 
for example, the direction to decline to be interviewed; 
making presentations or submissions that contain . . . 
omissions; and failure to promptly disclose illegal conduct 
known to the corporation.226 
The memorandum specifically notes that this “conduct intended to 
impede” does not need to reach the level of criminal obstruction.227  Thus, 
while it appears to be fixing the Stein problem, it carves out a relatively 
large exception. 
The McNulty Memorandum failed to redress some other problems of 
the Thompson Memorandum.  This memorandum continued to allow 
prosecutors to independently deem specific employees culpable for 
criminal wrongdoing and then hold this against the corporation if 
prosecutors believe the corporation is protecting them.228  The 
memorandum also allows prosecutors to consider negatively whether the 
corporation has entered into a joint-defense agreement.229  Because the 
memorandum left some of these problems unaddressed, or because they 
were not cured as well as they could have been Congress decided to 
intervene.  The House of Representatives has already passed H.R. 3013, 
the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007.230  If passed in the 
Senate, prosecutors would be prevented from requesting waivers of the 
attorney-client and work-product privilege, and it would prevent 
prosecutors from considering the assertion of these privileges as well as the 
advancement of attorneys’ fees and the retention of employees by an 
organization.231 
                                                                                                                          
225 Id. § 7.B.3, n.3. 
226 Id. § 7.B.4. 
227 See id. § 7.B.4 (“Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation, 
while purporting to cooperate, has engaged in conduct intended to impede the investigation (whether or 
not rising to the level of criminal obstruction).”). 
228 See id. § 7.B.3 (“Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation 
appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agents.”). 
229 Id. 
230 Keneally & Harris, supra note 5, at 5. 
231 See id. 
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B.  The Filip Revisions 
On August 28, 2008, the same day the Second Circuit affirmed the 
Stein I decision, Mark R. Filip announced the revisions to the DOJ’s 
corporate charging guidelines.232  Before announcing the specific revisions, 
Mr. Filip described the reasons he decided to revise the policy.  In doing 
so, he highlighted the criticisms of past policies: 
[M]any in the legal community have argued that prosecutors 
have unfairly demanded that corporations produce privileged 
materials or waive attorney-client or work-product 
protections as a precondition for receiving cooperation credit.  
Others have expressed concern that the Department could 
unfairly withhold such credit from a corporation that 
advanced attorneys’ fees to its employees, or failed to 
sanction culpable employees, or entered into joint defense 
agreements.233 
Mr. Filip demonstrated a desire to assuage concerns of prosecutorial abuse 
by engaging in “extended discussions” with a diverse array of groups.234  
These groups include “for example, the criminal defense bar, the civil 
liberties community, and the business community” as well as former DOJ 
officials.235  Mr. Filip lists as critical mandates that guide the revisions 
three principles: to enforce the law aggressively, to respect the rights of 
criminal defendants and others involved in the criminal justice process, and 
to promote fair outcomes for the American people.236  These revised 
principles were set forth for the first time not in the form of a 
memorandum, but in the United States Attorneys’ Manual.237  They were 
made binding on all federal prosecutors and made effective immediately.238 
The Filip revisions made four broad changes to the past policies.  First, 
the revisions shift the emphasis from waiving attorney-client and work-
product privileges to simply disclosing relevant facts in a timely manner.  
Mr. Filip announced, “[c]orporations that timely disclose relevant facts 
may receive due credit for cooperation, regardless of whether they waive 
                                                                                                                          
232 Filip’s August 28 Press Conference, supra note 7; see also Jonathan D. Glater & Michael M. 
Grynbaum, U.S. Lifts a Policy in Corporate Crime Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2008, at C6 (“‘Two 
branches of government in one day have announced their agreement that the government cannot 
pressure businesses and other entities to treat individuals in a way that it would be unconstitutional for 
the government to do directly,’ Stephanie Martz, director of the white-collar crime project for the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, wrote in an e-mail message.”). 
233 Filip’s August 28 Press Conference, supra note 7. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id.; see also U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 8. 
238 Filip’s August 28 Press Conference, supra note 7. 
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attorney-client privilege or work product protection in the process.”239  He 
attempted to restate this in other ways to be more clear, saying, “[t]he 
government will assess neither a credit nor a penalty based on whether the 
disclosed materials are protected by the attorney-client privilege or 
attorney work product.”240  The revisions forbid prosecutors from seeking 
what the McNulty Memorandum called Category II information.241  This 
prohibition has only two exceptions, but as Mr. Filip notes, both of which 
are well-recognized in existing law.242 
Second, prosecutors are “not to consider whether a corporation has 
advanced attorneys’ fees to its employees, officers, or directors when 
evaluating cooperativeness.”243  There is an exception to this, but unlike 
the McNulty Memorandum, it is only for conduct that rises to the level of 
criminal obstruction of justice.244  Mr. Filip notes that this will generally 
not be the case.245  Specifically, the new policy says the following on the 
subject: 
In evaluating cooperation, however, prosecutors should 
not take into account whether a corporation is advancing or 
reimbursing attorneys’ fees or providing counsel to 
employees, officers, or directors under investigation or 
indictment.  Likewise, prosecutors may not request that a 
corporation refrain from taking such action.  This prohibition 
is not meant to prevent a prosecutor from asking questions 
about an attorney’s representation of a corporation or its 
employees, officers, or directors, where otherwise 
appropriate under the law.  Neither is it intended to limit the 
otherwise applicable reach of criminal obstruction of justice 
statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 1503.  If the payment of attorney 
fees were used in a manner that would otherwise constitute 
criminal obstruction of justice—for example, if fees were 
advanced on the condition that an employee adhere to a 
version of the facts that the corporation and the employee 
knew to be false—these Principles would not (and could not) 
render inapplicable such criminal prohibitions.246 
                                                                                                                          
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 See id. (“A corporation’s payment of or advancement of attorneys’ fees to its employees will 
be relevant only in the rare situation where it, combined with other circumstances, would rise to the 
level of criminal obstruction of justice.”). 
245 Id. 
246 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 8, at ch. 9-28.730 (emphasis added). 
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Third, “federal prosecutors may not consider whether the corporation 
has entered into a joint defense agreement in evaluating whether to give the 
corporation credit for cooperating.”247  Fourth, under the new revisions 
prosecutors are not allowed to consider whether a corporation disciplined 
or terminated employees for the purpose of evaluating cooperation.248  
However, prosecutors may consider whether a corporation has “disciplined 
employees that the corporation identifies as culpable, and only for the 
purpose of evaluating the corporation’s remedial measures or compliance 
program.”249  Filip reminds corporations toward the end of his statements 
that a corporation’s refusal to cooperate is not evidence of guilt just as it 
would not be evidence of guilt for an individual.250  Mr. Filip made it clear 
that all of the revisions, “indeed the policy as a whole, reflect [the DOJ’s] 
commitment to treating corporations that are under investigation no better 
and no worse than individuals who are under investigation.”251 
C.  Curing the “Stein Problems” 
It is important not to forget that Stein I had two problems.  The 
Thompson Memorandum was only one.  The second problem was how the 
Government dealt with the zealous corporation that was exceedingly 
willing to cooperate.  The Thompson Memorandum alone was not the 
whole problem.  Where the revisions to the DOJ policy have been made, 
they have only addressed part of the Stein problem.  The underlying facts 
will still be the same in the future.  A corporation will still believe that an 
indictment would bring ruin.252  This means that a corporation under 
suspicion will still be extremely willing to cooperate with prosecutors.  
Therefore, the USAO will still be exposed to the risk of controlling the 
decisions of the corporation.  Judge Kaplan suggested that prosecutors 
should shift their goal from only being concerned with punishing the 
individuals who it deemed culpable to making sure that the corporation 
does not cross the line when it is trying to cooperate.  He wrote: 
The contretemps with KPMG over its Advisory 
Memorandum demonstrated the government’s desire, 
wherever possible, to interview KPMG witnesses without 
their being represented by lawyers.  The USAO’s ready 
acceptance of KPMG’s offer to cut off payment of legal fees 
for anyone who was indicted speaks for itself.  It speaks even 
                                                                                                                          
247 Filip’s August 28 Press Conference, supra note 7. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. (emphasis added). 
250 Id. 
251 Mark R. Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., Remarks as Delivered by Deputy Attorney General 
Mark R. Filip at American Bar Association Securities Fraud Conference (Oct. 2, 2008). 
252 See, e.g., supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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more eloquently when one considers that the USAO accepted 
KPMG’s assurance that it had no legal obligation to pay legal 
fees, knowing that (1) KPMG’s “common practice” had been 
to make such payments, (2) KPMG was extremely anxious to 
curry favor with the USAO by demonstrating how 
cooperative it could be, and (3) KPMG had an obvious 
conflict of interest with its present and former personnel on 
the question whether it had a legal obligation to pay fees.  
Had the government been less concerned with punishing 
those it deemed culpable right from the outset, it would not 
have accepted KPMG’s word on this point.253 
This suggests that the USAO has dual roles.  It is supposed to 
prosecute the case but at the same time it is also supposed to play the role 
of a watchful guardian or paternal figure.  Under the paternal role, the 
USAO should make sure the corporation is not undertaking policies that 
strip their employees of constitutional rights.  Moreover, they should 
discourage corporations from activities that would make the criminal 
justice process unfair to their employees.  This is a proactive responsibility.  
Judge Kaplan seems to suggest that simply being passive and compliant 
while the corporation makes decisions is not enough.  The suggestion is 
that the Government must oversee the process while making sure that the 
corporation does not go too far. 
Here, Judge Kaplan says that the Government would not have accepted 
KPMG’s word that they had no duty to pay the employees’ legal fees if it 
had not been so concerned with punishing those it deemed culpable.  Judge 
Kaplan expected the Government to at least inquire more into KPMG’s 
obligation (or lack thereof) to pay the legal fees.  This act would seem to 
go against the prosecutor’s obvious desire to get a conviction.  However, as 
noted above, the duty of the prosecutor is not to get a conviction, but to 
help administer justice.254  There may always be opportunity for the 
Government to abuse its position and power—that may be unavoidable.  
However, if all prosecutors enter these situations acknowledging their dual 
roles and the responsibilities that accompany them, the occurrence of abuse 
will decline. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
On the issue of advancement of attorneys’ fees, the Thompson 
Memorandum could have been relatively easily revised to comply with 
Judge Kaplan’s Stein I holding.  Judge Kaplan even offered a proposal.  He 
wrote that: 
                                                                                                                          
253 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
254 See supra text accompanying note 36. 
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[T]he Thompson Memorandum does not say that payment of 
legal fees may cut in favor of indictment only if it is used as a 
means to obstruct an investigation.  Indeed, the text strongly 
suggests that advancement of defenses costs weighs against 
an organization independent of whether there is any “circling 
of the wagons.”255 
Judge Kaplan suggested that this would be enough to make the 
Government interference narrowly tailored.  He wrote that: 
If the government means to take the payment of legal fees 
into account in making charging decisions only where the 
payments are part of an obstruction scheme—and thereby 
narrowly tailor its means to its ends—it would be easy 
enough to say so.  But that is not what the Thompson 
Memorandum says.256 
The DOJ attempted to comply with this suggestion, but it took 
advantage of Judge Kaplan’s seemingly ambiguous uses of the word 
“obstruction.”  As mentioned above, the McNulty Memorandum instructed 
prosecutors not to factor into their decision whether corporations advance 
attorneys’ fees unless “the totality of the circumstances show that it was 
intended to impede a criminal investigation.”257  The McNulty 
Memorandum uses the word “impede,”258 and not the word “obstruct.”259  
The Memorandum specifically notes that this “conduct intended to 
impede” does not need to reach the level of criminal obstruction.260  This 
leaves the potential for a court to find that the policy is not “narrowly 
tailored” enough to pass the strict scrutiny test. 
Mr. Filip recognized this as a potential problem.  The Filip revisions 
closed this gap by only allowing prosecutors to take into consideration the 
advancement of attorneys’ fees for conduct that rises to the level of 
criminal obstruction of justice.261  The Filip revisions strip from the 
                                                                                                                          
255 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363 (emphasis in original). 
256 Id. at 364. 
257 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6 § 7.B.3 n.3 (emphasis added). 
258 See id. (“In extremely rare cases, the advancement of attorneys’ fees may be taken into account 
when the totality of the circumstances show that it was intended to impede a criminal investigation.”). 
259 In § 7.B.4 of the McNulty Memorandum, the word “obstructing” is used, but immediately 
distinguished from “criminal obstruction.”  Id. §§ 7.B., 7.B.4. 
260 See id. (“Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation, while 
purporting to cooperate, has engaged in conduct intended to impede the investigation (whether or not 
rising to the level of criminal obstruction).”). 
261 See Filip’s August 28 Press Conference, supra note 7 (“A corporation’s payment of or 
advancement of attorneys’ fees to its employees will be relevant only in the rare situation where it, 
combined with other circumstances, would rise to the level of criminal obstruction of justice.”); see 
also U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 8, at ch. 9-28.730 (“This prohibition is not meant to prevent a 
prosecutor from asking questions about an attorney’s representation of a corporation or its employees, 
 
 2009] PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 317 
assessment any individual discretion of a prosecutor to decide whether 
there exists impeding conduct.  This means that Judge Kaplan would most 
likely approve of this new policy because it has “narrowly tailor[ed] its 
means to its ends.”262  It now appears that the DOJ’s policy on the 
advancement of legal fees has been rectified. 
However, the Filip revisions may not have resolved all of the problems 
in the Thompson Memorandum.  Mr. Filip made many changes to the 
policy on seeking waiver of the attorney-client and work-product 
privileges.  The attempt resulted in a compromise.  The revisions keep the 
credit-for-cooperation system, but forbid prosecutors from seeking 
information formally called “Category II” information.  Again, Category II 
information is attorney-client communications or any non-factual attorney 
work product.263 
The Filip revisions may not have fixed the problem of waiver.  As 
former Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty pointed out: 
While the primary, commendable aim of the revisions is 
to eliminate the perceived pressure to waive privilege in 
exchange for cooperation credit, the practical impact of these 
revisions remains to be seen.  Because the extent to which a 
corporation discloses relevant facts remains the touchstone of 
the credit-for-cooperation analysis, there may be significant 
pressure, implicit or explicit, to continue to waive if such 
facts are protected by privilege.264 
In other words, a corporation being investigated will still want to do 
everything within its power to avoid the indictment.  This means that it will 
still seek to get as much credit as possible, thus, it will still want to hand 
over the “Category II” information.  The only difference is that the 
prosecutor is not going to be the one initiating the transfer of this 
information.  The idea being that courts will likely find it very difficult to 
establish “state action” when it appears that the corporation is volunteering 
this information.  In reality, very little has changed.  Mr. McNulty suggests 
that the “significant pressure” to waive still exists, and may always exist in 
a credit-for-cooperation system. 
The problem is rooted in the fact that indictments are fatal to major 
corporations.265  This means that from the beginning of the process, a 
corporation is compelled to follow the prosecution’s instructions on how to 
                                                                                                                          
officers, or directors, where otherwise appropriate under the law. . . . Neither is it intended to limit the 
otherwise applicable reach of criminal obstruction of justice statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 1503.”). 
262 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
263 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, § 7.B.2. 
264 Paul J. McNulty, Against Backdrop of Setback in KPMG Case, Feds Revise McNulty Memo, 
23 ANDREWS LITIG. REP. 8, 9 (2008). 
265 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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avoid indictment.  Under the Filip revisions, like it was under the 
Thompson Memorandum, the way to avoid indictment is by cooperating 
with the Government.  Now, the Government will not view negatively a 
corporation’s refusal to give privileged information.  It will, however, still 
give credit for that privileged information.  Thus, a corporation is still 
compelled under the Filip revisions to disclose attorney-client and work-
product privileged information.  Under the Filip revisions the compelling is 
done differently, almost passively—allowing the implied threat of 
indictment to do the work. 
The DOJ has made significant changes to its policy on prosecuting 
business organizations.  It now seems unlikely that a case like Stein I 
where the Government interferes with the advancement of attorneys’ fees 
will occur under the Filip revisions.  However, there are other problems 
within the policy that may not have been cured by the Filip revisions.  One 
problem that remains is the potential for prosecutorial abuse.  Judge 
Kaplan found the actions of the prosecution to have violated the 
Constitution.266  This potential for abuse is inherent in the delicate nature 
of prosecuting corporations.  A second problem is that the revisions may 
not have sufficiently resolved the waiver dispute.  The future of the DOJ’s 
policy remains to be seen.  It is therefore appropriate to conclude with 
something a unanimous Supreme Court wrote long ago and that Judge 
Kaplan noted in Stein I: that the interest of the Government “in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”267 
                                                                                                                          
266 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336 (“The government, however, has let its zeal get in the way 
of its judgment. It has violated the Constitution it is sworn to defend.”). 
267 Id. at 381 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
